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The Origin of
the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny
by
A. Siegel*

Introduction
The principle that some governmental actions are
permissible only if they promote a “compelling state interest,”
and the doctrine of strict scrutiny of which it is an integral
part, are among the most important and distinctive tenets and of
modern constitutional law.1 They come into play, for example,
whenever government employs a suspect classification, burdens a
fundamental interest, or adopts a content-based regulation of
speech.2 Yet, recent developments, stemming largely from
affirmative action litigation, have led some commentators to
*
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1

See infra text accompanying notes 35-48 (discussing the
three branches of strict scrutiny).
2

See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 1146
(2005) (suspect classification); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93,
205 (2003) (fundamental interest); Republican Party of Minnesota
v. White, 536 U.S. 765 774-75 (2003) (content-based speech
regulation); Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles
and Policies 645, 767, 902-03 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing various
applications).
1

speculate about a fundamental shift in the compelling interest
test’s and strict scrutiny’s underlying purpose and future
direction.3 As a contribution to the debate, this Article traces
the origin of the compelling state interest standard and strict
scrutiny, seeking to clarify their history and the concerns that
shaped their development.
Conventional wisdom locates the origin of strict scrutiny
and the compelling state interest test in equal protection
litigation,4 tracing them initially to comments in Skinner v.
Oklahoma5 and Korematsu v. United States6 and, after a hiatus of
twenty years, to late Warren Court cases involving government
3

See infra text accompanying notes 287-88 (discussing the
cases and commentators). The same developments have led some
commentators to anticipate the doctrines’ wholesale demise.
See, e.g., Suzanne Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 481 (2004); Wilson Huhn, The Jurisprudential Revolution:
Unlocking Human Potential in Grutter and Lawrence, 12 Wm. & Mary
Bill Rts. J., 65, 96-97 (2003); Calvin Massey, The New
Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, U. of Pa. J. of Const.
L., 945, 970-80 (2004). The predictions of fundamental changes
in, and collapse of, strict scrutiny analysis trace back at
least to Jeffrey Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming
Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 161
(1984). Calls for sliding-scale, rather than tiered, review
trace back to the 1970s. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12
(1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70, 98-99, 109-10 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508-30
(1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Note, Justice Stevens’ Equal
Protection Jurisprudence, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1146 (1987).
4

See, e.g., Melvin Urofsky, Division and Discord: The
Supreme Court Under Stone and Vinson, 1941-53, at 89-90 (1997);
Goldberg, supra note 3, at 496-503; Greg Robinson and Toni
Robinson, Korematsu and Beyond: Japanese Americans and the
Origins of Strict Scrutiny, 68 Law & Contemp. Problems 29, 30-39
(2005); Larry Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions:
A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban against Racial
Discrimination, 15 San Diego L. Rev., 1041, 1068 (1978) (saying
strict scrutiny developed in cases challenging segregation).
5

316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).

6

323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
2

actions that employed suspect classifications or burdened
fundamental interests.7
This Article locates the development of the compelling
interest standard and strict scrutiny in a substantially
different place: litigation over First Amendment freedoms, such
as speech, religion, and association in the late 1950s and early
1960s. Skinner and Korematsu are famous, among other reasons,
for being the first cases to employ the terms “strict scrutiny”8
and “most rigid scrutiny.”9 But they did not employ the test
itself or any element of it.10
As other historians have recently pointed out,11 for a
quarter of a century after Justice Stone indicated in United
States v. Carolene Products12 that some constitutional interests
7

See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627, 634
(1969) (using the standard and tracing its development); id. at
660-61 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (tracing development of the
standard). See also Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
213-18 (1995) (tracing development strict scrutiny analysis of
federal statutes); E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 649, 668
(treating Skinner and Korematsu as early strict scrutiny cases);
Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. &
Publ Affairs 107, 147-48 (1975) (saying paradigmatic strict
scrutiny cases involve “equal protection” disputes “in the
racial context”).
8

316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).

9

323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).

10

See infra text accompanying notes 196-204; John Ely,
Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 146 n. 38
(1980) (saying Skinner failed rationality review); Michael
Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90
Mich. L. Rev. 213, 232 (1991) (saying Korematsu used
“rationality review”).
11

See, e.g., Howard Gillman, Preferred Freedoms: The
Progressive Expansion of State Power and the Rise of Modern
Civil Liberties Jurisprudence, 47 Political Res. Quart. 623,
644-48 (1994); G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of
Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America,
95 Mich. L. Rev. 299, 301-02 (1996).
12

304 U.S. 144 (1938).
3

would receive “more searching judicial inquiry,”13 the locus of
that “more exacting ... scrutiny”14 was the First Amendment, not
equal protection.15 But unlike these historians, this Article
discusses the operational doctrines through which the Court, in
First Amendment litigation, effectuated what G. Edward White has
called “bifurcated review.”16
The compelling state interest standard was a comparatively
late development in the evolution of bifurcated review.
Although the compelling state interest test has roots that reach
back to the 1940s,17 it first appeared in First Amendment
litigation in the late 1950s.18 Its birthing process was not
complete until 1963,19 at which time it coalesced with other
doctrines20 to form modern strict scrutiny analysis. It took
another six years for all the component parts of strict scrutiny
to migrate from the First Amendment to the Equal Protection
13

Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n. 4.

14

Id.

15

See Gillman, supra note 11, at 644-48; Klarman,
Interpretive, supra note 10, 232-35, 254-57 (saying that strict
scrutiny in equal protection cases began in the mid-1960s);
White, supra note 11, at 327-57 (discussing heightened scrutiny
of First Amendment cases from the 1940s to the 1960s).
16

White, supra note 11, at 327 (discussing the Court’s
“bifurcated review project,” which gives heightened protection
to favored constitutional interests and minimal protection to
all others).
17

See infra text accompanying notes 199-214 (discussing
Korematsu and Oyama); Stephen Siegel, The Death and Rebirth of
the Clear and Present Danger Test (manuscript on file with the
author).
18

See infra text accompanying notes 69-94 (discussing
appearance of the test).
19

See infra text accompanying notes 145-89 (discussing the
development of the test).
20

The other doctrines are “burden shifting” and “narrow
tailoring.” They are discussed infra text accompanying notes
36-48.
4

Clause. The compelling state interest standard was the last
component to make the move.21 When it did, strict scrutiny
rapidly blossomed into one of the late-twentieth century’s most
fundamental constitutional doctrines.22
Part I of this Article discusses the compelling state
interest test and strict scrutiny analytically, situating them
as one of many doctrines through which the Court gives
heightened protection to favored constitutional interests. Part
II describes the compelling interest test’s and strict
scrutiny’s origin in the First Amendment, while Part III
recounts their slow and piecemeal spread to the Equal Protection
Clause. Part IV discusses the revised history for the light it
sheds on strict scrutiny’s rationale, arguing that strict
scrutiny began as a tool of cost-benefit analysis, not as a
means to ferret out illicit governmental motive. Part V
concludes the Article by canvassing the revised history for the
light it sheds on the Court’s shifting understanding of whether
the Equal Protection Clause’s “core value”23 is the proscription
of racial subordination or racial classification.
I.

Situating the Compelling State Interest Test
and Strict Scrutiny

The compelling state interest test, and the doctrine of
strict scrutiny of which it is a part, are only two of a host of
techniques by which the Supreme Court, since the New Deal, has
bifurcated judicial review into heightened protection for
favored rights and minimal protection for the rest.
21

See infra text accompanying note 237-77.

22

Indeed, after blossoming in the Equal Protection Clause,
strict scrutiny returned to First Amendment jurisprudence with
even greater vigor and centrality. See, e.g., E. Chemerinsky,
supra note 2, at 902-04 (discussing the centrality of the
distinction between “content-based” and “content-neutral” laws
in First Amendment analysis); Edward Heck, Justice Brennan and
Freedom of Expression Doctrine in the Burger Court, 24 San Diego
L. Rev. 1153, 1177-80 (1986) (commenting on the increasing use
of strict scrutiny in First Amendment analysis after 1975).
23

Reva Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over
Brown, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470, 1505 (2004).
5

By “heightened protection,” I mean any rule, standard, or
analytic approach that gives a constitutional right more
security than the minimal protections of rationality review.24
Strict scrutiny is just one form of heightened protection. As
is well appreciated, in addition to strict scrutiny, there are
the doctrines of “intermediate scrutiny”25 and “minimal scrutiny
with bite.”26 These doctrines increase the protection for
24

On rationality review, see E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2,
at 651-53. Rationality review upholds any governmental action
that rationally promotes a legitimate purpose. Rationality
review is permissive because, at least since the New Deal, the
legitimate ends of government are so boundless, and the Court is
so deferential in ascribing legitimate purpose to governmental
action, that few laws can be said to violate this standard.
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955); Railway
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949); E.
Chemerinsky, supra, at 654-59.
Still, it is important to note that there are limits and
even rationality review may result in overturning sufficiently
egregious government action. At times, even a deferential court
may conclude that government action had an illicit purpose. A
classic example is Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960),
where the Court held that Alabama’s decision to change the
boundaries of Tuskegee, Georgia “from a square to an uncouth
twenty-eight-sided figure,” id. at 340, with the consequence of
fencing out all but a handful of its African-American voters,
was meant to exclude the voters because of their race. When
this happens, government action has run afoul the Constitution’s
“valid purpose” requirement. Under the valid purpose
requirement government action is unconstitutional when the Court
determines that the end it promotes is one of few ends that are
denied to modern government.
25

On intermediate scrutiny, see E. Chemerinsky, supra note
2, at 645, 723-38. In intermediate scrutiny, the government has
the burden of establishing that its actual purpose substantially
promotes an important government interest.
26

Jeffrey Shaman, Constitutional Interpretation: Illusion
and Reality 104 (2001). See also Robert Farrell, Successful
Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from 1971 through
Romer v. Evans, 32 Ind. L. Rev. 357, 361-63, 370 (1999)
(discussing the concept); Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
6

constitutional rights by subjecting governmental action to more
intense judicial examination, but do so by employing standards
that are different, and more forgiving, than strict scrutiny.27
More importantly, the whole regime of varying the tiers of
scrutiny is itself but one of the techniques by which the modern
Court gives differential protection to constitutional norms.
Most frequently, the Court gives heightened protection to
favored constitutional values simply by adopting a stringent
standard or rule to adjudicate cases burdening those values.
The rule of New York Times v. Sullivan,28 for example, that
government officials may sue for defamation only when the
defamer acted “with reckless disregard of whether [his
statement] was false or not”29 is a stringent standard that
substantially protects freedom of speech. But it protects
speech through a metric that is entirely different from what is
meant by strict scrutiny.30
Beyond adopting stringent substantive rules, the Court
occasionally strengthens the protection of favored
constitutional norms by relaxing procedural requirements that
limit the opportunity to assert them. “Overbreadth” doctrine is
an example of this approach. “Overbreadth,” which allows facial
challenges to statutes brought by individuals who are objecting
to how the law applies to third parties,31 gives First Amendment
Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 18-19 (1972) (same). The Court
is never forthright about whether it is employing “minimal
scrutiny with a bite” or the “valid purpose requirement.” There
will be no need to distinguish between them in this Article.
27

See infra text accompanying notes 35-37 (discussing
strict scrutiny’s standards). Because of these alternative
doctrines, not every instance of intensified scrutiny is an
instance of “strict scrutiny.”
28

356 U.S. 254 (1964).

29

New York Times, 356 U.S. at 280.

30

A similar instance is Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964), which adopted the stringent rule of “one person, one
vote” to protect voting rights).
31

See, e.g., E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 912-17
(discussing overbreadth); Daniel Farber, The First Amendment 4953, 74-75 (2d ed. 2003) (same); Morton Horwitz, The Warren Court
7

liberties increased protections through means that are not at
all related to strict scrutiny.
In short, there are a variety of doctrines that give
constitutional values heightened protection without employing
the approach that has come to be known as “strict scrutiny.”32
Indeed, the opinions that introduced the term “strict scrutiny”
into constitutional discourse did not actually use it.33 In
Skinner v. Oklahoma, for example, Justice Douglas subjected a
sterilization statute to heightened review. But he did so
through a non-deferential inquiry into whether the statute’s
classifications actually had a rational basis, employing the
form of review that today would be called “minimal scrutiny with
bite.”34
If strict scrutiny is but one of the approaches that give
enhanced protection to constitutional rights, the compelling
state interest standard is just one part of strict scrutiny
analysis. Strict scrutiny varies from ordinary scrutiny35 by
imposing three hurdles on the government. It shifts the burden
of proof to the government;36 requires the government to pursue a
and the Pursuit of Justice 71-75 (1998) (discussing overbreadth
and facial challenges); Robert McKay, The Preference for
Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. Rev., 1182, 1217-18 (1959) (discussing
“standing to sue”).
32

See M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 68-73
(discussing a variety of techniques used in First Amendment
litigation); McKay, supra note 31, at 1203-1222 (same).
33

See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). See
also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“most
rigid scrutiny”); infra notes 34, 196-204 (discussing Skinner
and Korematsu).
34

J. Ely, Democracy, supra note 10, at 146 n. 38 (saying
Skinner failed rational relation test).
35

Ordinary scrutiny, the form of analysis which
deferentially reviews most governmental action, is minimal
scrutiny. Minimal scrutiny upholds all action that is a
rational means to accomplish to a legitimate government purpose.
See E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 645-46.
36

See, e.g., E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 645.
8

“compelling state interest;” and demands that the regulation
promoting the compelling interest be “narrowly tailored.”37
Shifting the burden of proof is an expression of strict
scrutiny’s assumption that in certain situations the judiciary
should not accord the normal presumption of constitutionality to
government action. The burden shifting aspect of strict
scrutiny traces to the Supreme Court’s decision, in the late
1930s, to accord governmental action that burdened First
Amendment liberties a reduced presumption of constitutionality.38
In 1958, the reduced presumption of constitutionality in First
Amendment cases grew into full-fledged burden shifting. In that
year, Justice Brennan decided Speiser v. Randall39 by shifting
the burden of proof to the government and justified doing so on
the ground that, when facts are unclear, properly protecting
First Amendment rights requires imposing the cost of erroneous
conclusions on the government.40 A decade later, burden shifting
migrated into equal protection cases.41
37

See, e.g., E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 645
(discussing strict scrutiny).
38

See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153
n. 4 (1938) (citing First Amendment cases); McKay, supra note
31, at 1212-13. See also Klarman, Interpretive, supra note 10,
at 234 (tracing the “inver[sion] of the ordinary presumption of
constitutionality” in First Amendment cases to U.S. v. CIO, 335
U.S. 105, 140 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
39

357 U.S. 513 (1958).

40

Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 524-26 (1958). See
McKay, supra note 31, at 1221 (describing burden shifting as “a
distinctively new variation of the [First Amendment’s] preferred
position [that] was imaginatively supplied by Justice Brennan in
Speiser v. Randall”).
41

It is difficult to date precisely when burden shifting
entered equal protection analysis. The comment in Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) that racial
classifications are “immediately suspect” and subject to “the
most rigid scrutiny” certainly hints that racial classifications
will be accorded less of a presumption of constitutionality.
But the outcome of the case involved complete deference to, and
not a demand for proof from, the government. Perhaps the best
evidence that burden shifting was not established in equal
protection analysis until fairly late is that the Harvard Law
Review’s classic note on Developments in the Law - Equal
9

Strict scrutiny’s “narrow tailoring” requirement provides a
means to examine the government’s “precision of regulation,”42
allowing the Court to uphold government action “only if ... it
is necessary to achieve ... [the] compelling interest” that the
government has asserted as the purpose of its action.43 Narrow
tailoring demands that the fit between the government’s action
and its asserted purpose be “as perfect as practicable.”44
Strict scrutiny’s narrow tailoring requirement means that
legislation must be neither overinclusive nor underinclusive.
Narrow tailoring is the oldest branch of strict scrutiny.45
Tracing back to Gilded Age Commerce Clause adjudication, and
frequently used in Lochner-era police power cases, the “narrow
tailoring” doctrine gave meaningful protection to constitutional
norms well before the development of either modern bifurcated

Protection, published in March 1969, cited only a California
Supreme Court case for the proposition that “the ordinary
presumption of validity is reversed when a suspect
classification is made.” Developments in the Law - Equal
Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1101 (1969) (citing Sei Fujii
v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
If, as the Harvard Editors seem to do, we equate cases that
impose a heightened burden of justification with cases that
shift the burden of proof, see id. (citing Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967), then we may say that burden shifting
entered equal protection analysis in 1964.
42

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).

43

E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 645.

44

John Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf, 82 Yale L.J. 920,
933 n. 85 (1983). See also J. Ely, Democracy, supra note 10, at
146 (speaking of strict scrutiny’s “demand for an essentially
perfect fit”).
45

On the history of narrow tailoring, see Guy Struve, The
Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process,
80 Harv. L. Rev. 1463 (1967); Francis Wormuth and Harris Mirkin,
The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 Utah L. Rev 254
(1964); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78
Yale L. J. 464 (1969).
10

review or strict scrutiny.46 By 1940, the New Deal Court had
made narrow tailoring analysis a prominent part of First
Amendment jurisprudence.47 The Warren Court made it a part of
equal protection analysis in 1964.48
Thus the burden shifting and narrow tailoring branches of
strict scrutiny analysis originated outside of strict scrutiny,
and were vibrant facets of constitutional law and First
Amendment jurisprudence before their appearance in equal
protection litigation in the 1960s. But what of the “compelling
state interest” standard? When and where did it originate? And
when and where did the three strands of strict scrutiny coalesce
into that central doctrine of modern constitutional law?
In answering these questions, this Article demonstrates
that the compelling state interest standard and strict scrutiny
originated not in the Equal Protection Clause’s racial
discrimination cases, but in First Amendment litigation in the
late 1950s and early 1960s. Rather than being the earliest area
in which the compelling state interest standard appeared, racial
classification cases were among the last.
II.

The Birth of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict
Scrutiny

The notion that government needs “a compelling state
interest” to justify infringing of constitutionally protected
46

See Wormuth and Mirkin, supra note 45, at 257-70
(discussing the development of the doctrine).
47

Wormuth and Mirkin, supra note 45, at 271-77; infra text
accompanying notes 298-302 (mentioning narrow tailoring as part
of 1940s First Amendment jurisprudence). For Wormuth’s and
Mirkin’s complete discussion of narrow tailoring in First
Amendment cases, see id. at 270-93.
48

See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964); id.
at 197 (Harlan, J., concurring). Professors Tussman and
tenBroek argue that narrow tailoring should be an important part
of equal protection analysis but the absence of case citation
shows that in 1949, when they wrote their seminal article, that
development had not yet occurred. See Joseph Tussman and
Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. L.
Rev. 341, 344-53 (1949) (discussing reasonable classification).
11

values was established in First Amendment litigation in the late
1950s and early 1960s. In those years, immersed in Cold War
fears, concerns about national security, and anti-communist
hysteria,49 the Court was bitterly divided between Justices who
favored quite modest protection50 of First Amendment values and
Justices who favored robust protection.51 The low-protectionists
were led by Justice Felix Frankfurter who had been advancing
this position since the early 1940s.52 Justice John Marshall
Harlan was so closely associated with this endeavor that, in
First Amendment matters, contemporaries regarded him as
“Frankfurter-lite.”53 Justices Clark, Stewart, and Whittaker
composed the rest of the low-protectionist bloc.54 The high49

See Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law,
1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 247-49, 252, 258
(1992); M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 56-65, 67-68;
Lucas Powe, The Warren Court and American Politics 75-103, 13556 (2000); Martin Shapiro, Freedom of Speech: The Supreme Court
and Judicial Review 108-11 (1966); Geoffrey Stone, Perilous
Times: Free Speech in Wartime From the Sedition Act of 1798 to
the War on Terrorism 330-419 (2004).
50

I will hereinafter refer to this group of Justices as
low-protectionists.
51

I will hereinafter refer to this group of Justices as
high-protectionists. On the Court’s division into low- and
high-protectionists, see M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at
62-65 (recounting First Amendment cases decided by a 5-4 vote);
id. at 117 (Appendix) (listing the Court’s 4 liberal and 5
conservative Justices); L. Powe, supra note 49, at 88-90.
52

See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89-96 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (disputing the First Amendment’s
“preferred position”); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 648 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940); Wallace Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger – From
Schenck to Dennis, 52 Columb. L. Rev. 313, 320 (1952); M.
Urofsky, supra note 4, at 165-66; White, supra note 11, at 33740; Alpheus Mason, The Core of Free Government, 1838-1940: Mr.
Justice Stone and “Preferred Freedoms”, 65 Yale L.J. 597, 614-66
(1956).
53

L. Powe, supra note 49, at 143.

12

protectionist group consisted of Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan.55
As the low-protectionists were in the majority, their views
predominated until 1962 when Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker
retired for reasons of health.56 Whittaker and Frankfurter were
replaced by Byron White and Arthur Goldberg.57 Because Goldberg
consistently favored first amendment claimants,58 his appointment
gave high-protectionists a reliable majority for the first time
in Supreme Court history.59 It was Goldberg’s appointment that
launched the First Amendment on its course of sustained growth
that continues to this day.60
Nonetheless, before Goldberg’s appointment, during the
years in which low-protectionists composed the majority,61 the
54

See, e.g., M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 117
(Appendix) (listing the Court’s 5 conservative Justices).
55

See M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 117 (Appendix)
(listing the Court’s 4 liberal Justices); L. Powe, supra note
49, at 88-90.
56

L. Powe, supra note 49, at 205, 209-10.

57

M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 63-66; L. Powe,
supra note 49, at 210-12.
58

M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 65-66; L. Powe,
supra note 49, at 211-12. Justice White was not a consistent
civil libertarian. See M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at
71, 117 (saying Justice White did not generally protect civil
liberties and listing him among the Warren Court’s
conservatives); L. Powe, supra, at 210-11, 304.
59

L. Powe, supra note 49, at 209-11, 303-35. In the
1940s, high-protectionists had a solid bloc of four Justices
which, because they frequently attracted votes from the moderate
center, prevailed in a wide-variety of cases. They did not,
however, have a majority. See Mendelson, Clear, supra note 52,
at 320; Siegel, Death, supra note 17, at *.
60

See M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 65-73; L.
Powe, supra note 49, at 209-16, 497-501.
61

The entire period of low-protectionist dominance dates
from 1949 to 1962. In the 1940s, high-protectionist had more
13

Warren Court ruled against First Amendment claimants in many
high profile cases.62 There were exceptions,63 of course, and in
six cases, decided between 1957 and 1960, the state’s failure to
assert a compelling interest was among the reasons given for why
the First Amendment claimant should prevail.64 As the opinions
influence, but they lost it when two of their numbers, Justices
Murphy and Rutledge, died. See Siegel, Death, supra note 17, at
*.
62

See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)
(upholding the enforcement of Sunday closing laws against
Orthodox Jews); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961) (upholding
denial of bar admission for refusing to answer questions about
communist affiliation); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109 (1959) (upholding contempt of Congress conviction of college
professor for refusing to answer HUAC questions); Lerner v.
Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 477-79 (1958) (upholding firing a subway
conductor for failure to answer questions about Communist Party
membership); Bauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952)
(upholding group libel laws); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951) (upholding conviction of Communist Party leadership
for conspiring to advocate the necessity of overthrowing the
government); M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 62-65
(discussing the cases); L. Powe, supra note 49, at 135-56
(same).
63

See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)
(voiding statutes requiring that teachers reveal all
organizations to which they belong or contribute); Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (voiding laws banning anonymous
leafleting); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957)
(overturning Smith Act conviction of “second-tier” Communist
Party officials); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957)
(overturning contempt of Congress conviction for refusing to
answer HUAC questions when their pertinency was not explained to
witness).
64

Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960) (Harlan,
J., concurring); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524
(1960); Scull v. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. Commitee on
Law Reform and Racial Activities, 359 U.S. 344, 352 (1959);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958); NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262, 265 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). The compelling interest standard was also set out
in a dissent. See also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 610
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in four of these cases were written by low-protectionists,65 who
also set out the compelling interest standard in two cases in
which they ruled against First Amendment claimants,66 the seminal
appearances of the compelling interest standard in Supreme Court
jurisprudence require close analysis to determine what the
concept meant to the Justices who first used it.
This section undertakes that analysis and concludes that
the compelling state interest test, when employed by lowprotectionist Justices between 1957 and 1960, was not meant to
be a stringent standard. Moreover, it was in the process of
being abandoned when Goldberg’s appointment turned majority
control over to Justices who favored First Amendment values.
Thus despite its appearance before Goldberg’s appointment, the
compelling state interest standard was not established in the
First Amendment until 1963. In that year, it was used in three
opinions written for a transformed Court by the highprotectionist Justices Brennan and Goldberg.67 These opinions,
which established the compelling state interest test and strict
scrutiny as part of First Amendment jurisprudence, also
announced the birth of what commentators have called “history’s
Warren Court.”68
(1961) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (using the
compelling standard as the standard for his dissent).
65

See Talley, 362 U.S. at 66 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(discussed infra note 115); Bates, 361 U.S. at 517 (discussed
infra text accompanying notes 122-26); NAACP, 357 U.S. at 451
(discussed infra text accompanying notes 120-224); Sweezy, 354
U.S. at 255 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussed infra text
accompanying notes 69-94).
66

Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 127 (1959)
(discussed infra text accompanying notes 106-12); Uphaus v.
Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 79-81 (1959) (discussed infra text
accompanying notes 101-05).
67

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399, 403, 406 (1963)
(discussed infra text accompanying notes 182-89); Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Investigative Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 540,
546 (1963) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 172-81);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 417, 438, 439 (1963) (discussed
infra text accompanying notes 163-71).
68

See L. Powe, supra note 49, at 207. See also id. at
209-16, 497-501 (dating “history’s Warren Court” to the 1962
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A.

First Mention of the Compelling State Interest Standard

The notion that the government needs “a compelling state
interest” to justify an infringement of constitutionally
protected values first appeared in 1957 in Justice Frankfurter’s
concurrence to Sweezy v. New Hampshire.69 In Sweezy, the Supreme
Court overturned Paul Sweezy’s contempt conviction for refusing
to answer questions put to him by New Hampshire’s Attorney
General who was investigating subversive activities on behalf of
the state legislature.70 Sweezy, who was a socialist and a
professor at the University of New Hampshire, refused to answer
questions about his classroom lectures and his involvement with
the Progressive Party.71
In deciding Sweezy, Chief Justice Warren announced the
judgment of the Court and wrote for himself and Justices Black,
Douglas, and Brennan – his fellow high-protectionists. Warren’s
opinion ultimately rested on narrow grounds: that in
questioning Sweezy, the Attorney General was acting beyond the
legislature’s authorizing resolution.72 Leading into this part
of his opinion, however, Warren touched on the case’s broader
issues. The case involved a college professor’s “right to
lecture and his right to associate with others.”73 The state
Supreme Court recognized this, but determined that Sweezy’s
First Amendment rights were “outweighed” by the legislature’s
interest in knowing whether “there exists a potential menace
from those who would overthrow the government by force and

Term); M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 10-12, 37-46, 65
(noting the importance of Goldberg’s appointment but also
indicating that outside of the First Amendment, a liberal
majority did not “jell” until Thurgood Marshall’s appointment).
69

Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). Sweezy is
insightfully discussed in L. Powe, supra note 49, at 97-98.
70

Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 237.

71

Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 238-44.

72

Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 253-55.

73

Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 249.
16

violence.”74
suggested

Responding to this balancing analysis, Warren

[w]e do not now conceive of any circumstance wherein a
state interest would justify infringement of rights in
these fields. But we do not need to reach such fundamental
questions of state power to decide this case.75
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan made up the rest of the
Sweezy majority.76 Although they agreed that Sweezy’s contempt
conviction could not stand, as the Court’s leading deferential
Justices they could not assent to any part of Warren’s
rationale. Frankfurter and Harlan thought that Warren’s narrow
ground was essentially a matter of state law for which the New
Hampshire Supreme Court’s contrary decision was binding.77 Nor
could they abide Warren’s hint of a non-deferential approach to
the case’s broader First Amendment issues.78 Accordingly,
Frankfurter, joined by Harlan, wrote a separate opinion that in
many ways was a typical deferential balancing analysis.
Frankfurter began by noting that in cases like Sweezy
[o]urs is the narrowly circumscribed but exceedingly
difficult task of making the final judicial accommodation
between the competing weighty claims that underlie all such
questions of due process.79
74

Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 251.

75

Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 251.

76

Two other low-protectionist Justices, Clark and Burton,
dissented. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 267-70 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Justice Whittaker did not take part in the decision. Id. at
255.
77

Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 257 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See also id. at 268 (Clark, J., dissenting) (same).
78

Frankfurter and Harlan were the leading lowprotectionist Justices. See supra text accompanying notes 5253.
79

Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 256 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Frankfurter’s emphasis in the quoted language on general due
process, rather than the more specific First Amendment, should
be noted. It was part of his constant effort to liken free
17

The decision involved “balancing two contending principles – the
right of a citizen to political privacy ... and the right of the
State to self-protection.” Striking the appropriate balance, he
said,
must not be an exercise of whim or will. It must be an
overriding judgment founded on something much deeper and
more justifiable than personal preference. As far as it
lies within human limitations, it must be an impersonal
judgment. It must rest on fundamental presuppositions
rooted in history to which widespread acceptance may fairly
be attributed. Such a judgment must be arrived at in the
spirit of humility when it counters the judgment of the
State’s highest court.80
Yet, for a low-protectionist jurist, Frankfurter’s
concurrence was unique in three respects. First, Frankfurter
composed what Professor Lucas Powe has aptly described as “the
most powerful First Amendment defense of academic freedom in the
United States Reports that exists to this day.”81 “For society’s
good,” Frankfurter wrote,
inquiries into [the physical and social sciences],
speculations about them, stimulation in others of
reflection, must be left as unfettered as possible.
speech cases to review of economic regulations. See M. Urofsky,
supra note 4, at 21, 165-55; White, supra note 11, at 338-40.
80

Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

81

L. Powe, supra note 49, at 97. See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at
261-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing the importance
of academic freedom); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328
(2003) (drawing from Sweezy’s discussion of academic freedom);
id. at 362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in
part) (same); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. System v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 237-38 (Souter, J., concurring)
(same); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 835-36 (1995) (same); Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493
U.S. 183, 196-97 (1990) (same). Even before Sweezy, Frankfurter
had written at length about the importance of academic freedom,
describing “teachers ... as the priests of our democracy” in
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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These pages need not be burdened with proof ... of the
dependence of a free society on free universities. This
means the exclusion of governmental intervention in the
intellectual life of a university. It matters little
whether such intervention occurs avowedly or through action
that inevitably tends to check the ardor and fearlessness
of scholars, qualities at once so fragile and so
indispensable for fruitful academic labor.82
Second, Frankfurter’s Sweezy concurrence is unusual
because, although the case involved the government’s security
needs, Frankfurter ruled against the government, arguing that
When weighed against the grave harm resulting from
governmental intrusion into the academic life of a
university, [the government’s] justification for compelling
a witness to discuss the contents of his lecture appears
grossly inadequate.83
The final unique aspect of Frankfurter’s Sweezy concurrence
is the reason Frankfurter thought the balance of conflicting
interests favored Sweezy. Frankfurter thought the balance of
conflicting interests favored Sweezy because of the importance
of academic freedom to a free society. Due to academic
freedom’s critical importance, Frankfurter asserted that the

82

Sweezy, 354 U.S. 261-62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Frankfurter also quoted at length from a recent “poignant ...
[but] unheeded” statement of South African scholars to the
effect that
[i]t is the business of a university to provide that
atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation,
experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there
prevail “the four essential freedoms” of a university — to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study.
Id. at 262-63 (quoting The Open Universities in South Africa 1912 (n.d.)).
83

Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 261 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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state needed singularly important reasons for burdening it.84
Frankfurter put it:

As

Political power must abstain from intrusion into this
activity of freedom ... except for reasons that are exigent
and obviously compelling.”85
This is the first appearance of the “compelling state interest”
test in Supreme Court precedent.86
In light of Frankfurter’s usual devotion to deferential
adjudication, it is hard to accept that Frankfurter meant what
he wrote in Sweezy. Later in his opinion, he did pull back a
bit. When speaking of the Attorney General’s inquiries, not
into Sweezy’s college lectures, but into his engagement with the
Progressive Party, Frankfurter wrote:
For a citizen to be made to forego even a part of so basic
a liberty as his political autonomy, the subordinating
interest of the State must be compelling.87
In this latter context, “compelling” is less forceful as it is
not conjoined with the term “exigent,” a term clearly indicating
an urgent and pressing quality for the state interest.
84

It is instructive to contrast Frankfurter’s concurrence
with the dissent of Justices Clark and Minton. In an opinion
that was more typical of low-protectionists, those Justices
simply said that they were
not convinced that the State’s interest in investigating
subversive activities for the protection of its citizens is
outweighted by any necessity for the protection of Sweezy.
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 270 (Clark, J., dissenting).
85

Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262. See also id. at 265 (quoted
infra text accompanying note 87).
86

The phrase had been used on a few occasions in non-civil
liberties contexts. See New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369,
373 (1953) (test for a city attempting to intervene in a suit
brought by its state against another state); Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414, 442 (1944) (test for summary action).
87

Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 265.
20

Nevertheless, Frankfurter probably did mean what he wrote
in Sweezy, as uncharacteristic as his undeferential stance may
be. Frankfurter’s Sweezy concurrence was uncharacteristic in
several regards, not just in the extensive protection it offered
the “academic freedom” branch of First Amendment values.
Frankfurter usually did not write passionate opinions. He was
the leading proponent of impersonal adjudication, something he
called for in Sweezy itself.88 Yet, it is not too much to
suggest that Frankfurter’s heightened standard for interest
balancing in Sweezy, as well as his passion, reflected something
highly personal: that he was a former academic who gloried in
that life and role.89 If so, the scope of Frankfurter’s
heightened “exigent and obviously compelling” state interest
test would be limited to academic freedom cases.
It is also possible that Frankfurter was advancing
something broader in Sweezy. Sweezy was handed down on June, 17
1957, which quickly was dubbed “Red Monday” because the Court
released four decisions that day severely restricting the
government’s Cold War national security and loyalty programs.90
In Sweezy, Frankfurter might have been drawing a constitutional
line between advocates of communism and advocates of other leftwing ideologies, such as the groups to which Paul Sweezy
belonged.91 “In the political realm, as in the academic,”
Frankfurter wrote,
88

Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 267 (quoted supra text accompanying
note 80). See also Ken Kersch, Construction Civil Liberties 86
(2004) (saying Frankfurter called for decision according to
“objective standards”).
89

Frankfurter, for example, always acted as a professor
towards his fellow Justices, to their great annoyance. See M.
Urofsky, supra note 4, at 33-9 (discussing Frankfurter’s
temperament and friction on the Court). Religious freedom was
another area that Frankfurter took personally and wrote
impassioned opinions. See People ex rel. McCollum v. Illinois,
333 U.S. 203, 212-32 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); West
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646-71 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
90

See M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 59-62
(discussing “Red Monday”); L. Powe, supra note 49, at 93-98
(same).
91

Sweezy was a Marxist-socialist and a member of the
Progressive Party. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 241-43.
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thought and action are presumptively immune from
inquisition by political authority. ... Until recently, no
difference would have been entertained in regard to
inquiries about a voter’s affiliations with one of the
various so-called third parties that have had their day, or
longer, in our political history. ... Whatever, on the
basis of massive proof and in the light of history, of
which this Court may well take judicial notice, be the
justification for not regarding the Communist Party as a
conventional political party, no such justification has
been afforded in regard to the Progressive Party. A
foundation in fact and reason would have to be established
far weightier than the intimations that appear in the
record to warrant such a review of the Progressive Party.
This precludes the questioning that [Sweezy] resisted in
regard to that Party.92
Read this way, the scope of Frankfurter’s
uncharacteristically non-deferential concurrence in Sweezy was
considerably broad. It protected members of perhaps all
disfavored political associations, with the singular exception
of communists, who were viewed more as a paramilitary
organization than as a political movement.93 This reading also
meaningfully accounts for Frankfurter’s difference with Warren’s
plurality opinion, which suggested stringent First Amendment
protection even for members of the Communist Party.94
B.

Second Thoughts About the Compelling State
Interest Test

Whatever Frankfurter meant by Sweezy’s “exigent and
obviously compelling” state interest standard, he and Justice
Harlan (who had joined the Sweezy concurrence) quickly reverted
to their low-protectionist, deferential-balancing approach.95
92

Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 266.

93

See, e.g., Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494, 577 (Jackson,
J., concurring).
94

See L. Powe, supra note 49, at 98; supra text
accompanying note 75 (quoting Warren’s absolutist rhetoric in
Sweezy).
95

Cases in which the Court defended the NAACP against
attack by southern legislatures form a temporary exception to
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The Court’s four “Red Monday” decisions, along with its race and
criminal procedure decisions, provoked an uproar in Congress.96
In 1958, Congress considered, and came very close to passing, a
host of anti-Court bills, including one that would strip the
Court of its appellate jurisdiction in domestic security cases.97
As Professor Powe recounts:
The anti-Court bills caused Frankfurter to get religion
again. ... Frankfurter interpreted ... Congress as having
questioned whether an independent judiciary might be too
high a price to pay when the cost was the eradication of
the loyalty-security programs. Thus, one of the two would
have to give way .... Frankfurter was ready to save the
Court; prudence dictated the Court yield in this area. His
dalliance with the four liberals ... was over.98
Frankfurter’s and Harlan’s reversion to the “government
action is constitutional if it is reasonable”99 standard was
first manifested in a pair of 1958 cases involving public
employees who relied on the Fifth Amendment to refuse to answer
questions about Communist Party membership.100 By 1959, their
this statement. See infra text accompanying notes 119-26
(discussing the cases).
96

See M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 64-65; L.
Powe, supra note 49, at 127-35.
97

Walter Murphy, Congress and the Court 127-223 (1962); L.
Powe, supra note 49, at 127-35; C. Herman Pritchett, Congress
Versus the Supreme Court 1957-1960 at 107-16 (1961); William
Ross, Attacks on the Warren Court by State Officials, 50 Buffalo
483, 497-507 (2002).
98

L. Powe, supra note 49, at 141-42. See also Michael
Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and
the Struggle for Racial Equality 334-35 (2004) (discussing the
Court’s retrenchment on civil rights).
99

L. Powe, supra note 49, at 142. See also M. Horwitz,
Warren, supra note 31, at 62-64 (recounting the Court’s
“retreat”).
100

See L. Powe, supra note 49, at 137-38 (discussing
Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958) and Beilan v. Bd. of
Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958)).
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reversion to deferential analysis had spread to cases involving
private citizens who premised their refusal to respond to
questions posed by legislative investigating committees on the
First Amendment.
The first of the 1959 decisions, Uphaus v. Wyman,101
involved a camp director who refused to divulge the list of
speakers who had given talks at his leftist summer camp.102
Writing for a five Justice majority that included Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan, Justice Clark said “we have for decision
the ... question of whether the public interests overbalance
[the] conflicting private ones.”103 After noting that “the
academic and political freedoms discussed in Sweezy ... are not
present here in the same degree, since [the camp] is neither a
university nor a political party,”104 Clark easily found that the
governmental interest in “learn[ing] if subversive persons were
in the State .... is sufficiently compelling to subordinate the
interest in associational privacy.”105
Uphaus’s “sufficiently compelling” state interest
requirement said nothing about the quantum of the weight
required for the state to override First Amendment rights. As
used in Uphaus, the compelling interest standard meant only that
to override First Amendment freedoms the state had to assert an
interest that was important enough under circumstances.
Uphaus’s “sufficiently compelling” standard was a tautology
requiring nothing more than that, on balance, the state interest
outweigh the private interest.

101

360 U.S. 72 (1959).

102

Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 73-75.

103

Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 78.

104

Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 77.

105

Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 79-81. Clark approvingly cited
Dennis v. United States, 314 U.S. 494, 509 (1951). Clark
reasoned that determining the presence of subversive persons
implicated the state’s “interest of self-preservation.” Uphaus,
360 U.S. at 80.
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The other decision, Barenblatt v. United States,106 involved
a college professor who refused to answer questions about
membership in the Communist Party and Communist-front clubs when
he was called before the House Un-American Activities
Committee.107 After setting out a balancing of interests
approach to the issues,108 and noting that in First Amendment
cases the “subordinating interest of the State must be
compelling,”109 Justice Harlan ruled (on behalf of the same five
Justice majority that had decided Uphaus) that Barenblatt’s
contempt conviction was “beyond question.”110 Despite Harlan’s
use of Sweezy’s “compelling interest” rubric, commentators
immediately began critically analyzing Harlan’s opinion as a
paradigmatic example of the Cold War Court’s highly deferential
approach to First Amendment disputes.111 These commentators
recognized that Harlan was using the “compelling interest”

106

360 U.S. 109 (1959).

107

Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 114.

108

Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 126-27.

109

Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 127 (quoting Sweezy; internal
quotation marks removed).
110

Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 133.

111

M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 68; L. Powe,
supra note 49, at 144-45; M. Shapiro, supra note 49, at 83-87;
Samuel Krislov, The Supreme Court in the Political Process 11516 (1965); Laurent Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance,
71 Yale L.J. 1424, 1438-40, 1443-44 (1962); Melville Nimmer, The
Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 Cal. L. Rev. 935,
939-41 (1968); Charles Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living
Constitution, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 673, 718-20 (1963); Edmund Cahn,
The Firstness of the First Amendment, 65 Yale L.J. 464, 479-80
(1956) (describing deferential Justices as “laissez-faire
jurists”); Frank Strong, Fifty Years of Clear and Present
Danger: From Schenck to Brandenburg – and Beyond, 1969 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 41, 57-59 (discussing the contemporary criticism); Siegel,
Death, supra note 17, at * (on file with the author). Scholarly
attention followed, in part, Justice Black’s forceful dissent.
See Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 143-62 (Black, J., dissenting).
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standard as it had been defined in Uphaus, the case with which
Barenblatt was argued and decided.112
After Uphaus and Barenblatt, the deferential majority
decided case after case employing a balancing analysis without
mentioning a requirement for the state to have a “compelling”
interest.113 Justice Harlan, for example, writing for the Court
in Koningberg v. State Bar of California,114 spoke of laws
burdening First Amendment rights as permissible simply “when
they have been found justified by subordinating valid
governmental interests.”115 As far as the deferential majority
was concerned, Sweezy’s “exigent and obviously compelling” state
interest requirement was a sport that was on the road to
oblivion.116
If the deferential majority had shown no commitment to
Sweezy’s “compelling state interest” standard, neither did half
of the high-protectionist minority. Justices Black and Douglas
were First Amendment absolutists. For them, even a stringent
“exigent and obviously compelling” state interest standard would
112

Uphaus and Barenblatt were argued and decided on the
same days, with Uphaus as the first case in both instances. See
Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 72; Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 109.
113

See, e.g., In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961) (bar
membership); Konigsburg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36
(1961) (same); Braden v. U.S., 365 U.S. 431 (1961) (legislative
investigation); Wilkenson v. U.S., 365 U.S. 399 (1961) (same).
114

366 U.S. 36 (1961).

115

Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 50 (1961). In the post-Uphaus
world, it was the equivalence between the “compelling”,
“sufficiently compelling,” and merely “subordinating” interest
standards that allowed the deferential Justice Harlan to employ
the “compelling” standard when he was not speaking for the
Court. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
116

After Uphaus, the deferential majority mentioned the
“compelling interest” standard once more in a case involving the
NAACP, but that and other cases show the deferential majority
was not employing it as a stringent standard. See infra text
accompanying notes 122-26, 133-45 (discussing Bates v. Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
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be too low because it involved balancing.117 History showed that
when tensions rose, balancing gave way to state power. As
Martin Shapiro has written, Black and Douglas
repeatedly pointed out [that] ... balancing ... was most
useful to those who were willing to ... allow ... freedom
of speech to go by the boards. Because it allowed a
flexible weighing in each case without enunciation of any
principle to which the Court might have to stick even when
Congress later violated it, and because it constantly
repeated that it was constitutionally legitimate for
Congress to violate the First Amendment, ad hoc balancing
provided a jurisprudential screen behind which judges could
always yield gracefully .... By overweighing the danger and
minimizing and excusing the damage to free speech ... the
Court can always simply surrender to hysteria, and in
surrendering provide it with a cover of constitutional
respectability which feeds its fires.118
The only exception to the demise of the Sweezy standard was
the Court’s use of it in cases involving attempts by various
southern states to acquire the NAACP’s membership lists,
presumably to expose the organizations “rank-and-file ... to
117

Consider, for example, Scull v. Commonwealth of
Virginia ex rel. Commitee on Law Reform and Racial Activities,
359 U.S. 344 (1959) decided before Uphaus. Justice Black took
the rare opportunity of his writing for the Court to tilt the
law in a high-protectionist direction. Before deciding the case
on nonconstitutional grounds, Black mentioned that the Court had
held that the freedoms of speech, press, and association “cannot
be invaded unless a compelling state interest is clearly shown.”
Id. at 352-53. But he immediately dropped a footnote to
Warren’s plurality opinion in Sweezy to the effect that “Four
members of this Court adhere to the view they expressed in
Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 251, ... and 'do
not now conceive of any circumstances wherein a state interest
would justify infringement of rights in these fields.’” Scull,
supra, at 352.
118

M. Shapiro, supra note 49, at 110. In an unfortunately
apt case, Justice Black once ruefully observed that “[t]he
effect of the Court’s ‘balancing’ ... is that any State may now
reject an applicant for admission to the Bar if he believes in
the Declaration of Independence ...” In Re Anastaplo, 366 U.S.
82, 112 (1961).
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economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical
coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.”119
Between the Sweezy and Uphaus decisions, Justice Harlan, writing
for a unanimous court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
answered the question of
whether Alabama has demonstrated an interest in obtaining
[the NAACP membership list] ... which is sufficient to
justify the deterrent effect which ... these disclosures
may well have on the free exercise by [the NAACP’s] members
... right of association120
by noting that
Such a ‘... subordinating interest of the State must be
compelling,’ Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265
...121
Two years later, in Bates v. City of Little Rock, a case
that involved the City’s power to obtain the NAACP’s membership
list to check the NAACP’s claim that it qualified for tax
purposes as a charitable institution, Justice Stewart said:
Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal
liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a
subordinating interest which is compelling.122
Perhaps these cases show that Sweezy’s “compelling”
interest standard was not entirely a sport, even for the Court’s
low-protectionist majority. Some contemporaries thought the
Court was making a special exception to its generally
119

NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462
(1958). The cases discussed in the next paragraphs are
insightfully set in the context of the Court’s post-Brown v.
Board of Education struggle with southern intransigence in M.
Klarman, supra note 98, at 335-37; L. Powe, supra note 49, at
165-69. See also M. Klarman, supra, at 335-40, 382-84
(discussing the South’s overall attack on the NAACP).
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NAACP, 357 U.S. at 463.
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NAACP, 357 U.S. at 463.
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Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
See M. Klarman, supra note 98, at 335 (treating Bates as an
anti-NAACP case).
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deferential jurisprudence in order to protect the NAACP in its
(and the Court’s) battle against massive southern resistence to
school desegregation.123 Still, it should be noted that:
(1) Patterson may itself have been part of the movement
away from Sweezy’s strict standard. In Patterson, Harlan did
not quote or even cite Sweezy’s first, clearly stringent,
statement of its standard, which required not just a
“compelling,” but an “exigent and obviously compelling,”
interest.124
(2) In Bates, although Justice Stewart did say the State
needed a “compelling” interest to prevail, in the very next
paragraph he concluded his discussion of the law by saying that
in this case “it becomes the duty of this Court to determine
whether the [City’s] action bears a reasonable relationship to
the achievement of the governmental purpose asserted as its
justification.”125 By using the “compelling” and “reasonable”
standards interchangeably, Stewart’s opinion intimated an
equivalence between them. Indeed, just two weeks after Bates,
most of the low-protectionist Justices showed that they
understood Bates to stand for the “reasonable” standard when
they cited and quoted only Stewart’s second paragraph as
providing “the requirements of our cases.”126
For these reasons it is proper to see Patterson and Bates
as reflecting the Court’s recession from Sweezy’s stringent
“exigent and obviously compelling” state interest standard.
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See M. Shapiro, supra note 49, at 82; L. Powe, supra
note 49, at 169; The Supreme Court, 1962 Term - Leading Cases,
77 Harv. L. Rev. 81, 122-23 (1963).
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NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460-67. Similarly, the Bates case,
in supporting the imposition of a “compelling” standard, did not
cite Sweezy. Rather, it cited Patterson and a string of cases
from the 1940s in which only modestly active balancing had been
employed. Bates, 361 U.S. at 524.
125

Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 69 n. 1 (1960)
(Clark, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., and Whittaker, J.,
dissenting).
126

Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 69 (1960) (Clark,
J., joined by Frankfurter, J., and Whittaker, J., dissenting).
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In the end, even if the Patterson and Bates cases gave
Sweezy’s “compelling” interest standard some extended life, the
Court’s deferential majority completely abandoned it in 1961127
in two cases in which the NAACP once again sought protection
from hostile southern legislatures.128
One case, NAACP v. Button,129 involved Virginia’s attempt to
apply to the NAACP a recently enacted law prohibiting
solicitation of legal business. The legislation, which had been
adopted in 1956 as part of Virginia’s “massive resistance” to
school desegregation,130 prohibited “any person or organization
not having a pecuniary right or liability in a lawsuit to
127

For the 1961 date, see The Supreme Court in Conference
(1940-1985): The Private Discussions Behind Nearly 300 Supreme
Court Decisions 317 (Del Dickson, ed. 2001) (dating the Court’s
conference on one of the cases, NAACP v. Button, as Nov. 10,
1961) (hereinafter D. Dickson); L. Powe, supra note 49, at 155
(stating the other case, Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Committee, was argued in December, 1961; cases
usually are discussed and voted on in conference shortly after
their argument).
128

The deferential majority’s movement away from employing
a heightened standard to protect the NAACP was foreshadowed in
late 1960, in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), when four
of its members voted to allow Arkansas to require public school
teachers to file annual affidavits disclosing “every
organization to which he has belonged or contributed for the
past five years.” Id. at 480. The law was enacted to reveal
whether teachers were NAACP members. L. Powe, supra note 49, at
168. The Court struck the statute down only because the usually
deferential Justice Stewart voted with the high-protectionist
minority on the grounds that the statute should have been more
“narrowly” tailored given its impact on “fundamental personal
liberties.” Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488.
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371 U.S. 415 (1963). See infra text accompanying note
146 (explaining why the case’s decision date is 1963, rather
than 1961, and why the NAACP won rather than lost). Button is
tellingly discussed in M. Klarman, supra note 98, at 337-39; L.
Powe, supra note 49, at 169-71.
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L. Powe, supra note 49, at 170; Note, The Supreme
Court, 1962 Term – Leading Cases, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 81, 122
(1963).
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solicit legal business for itself or for any attorney.”131 Given
how the NAACP represented its clients, the law threatened to put
an end to NAACP litigation.132
The other case, Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation
Committee,133 arose when the Committee asked the NAACP to reveal
whether “specific individuals, otherwise identified as, or
suspected of being, communists were NAACP members.”134 If
allowed, the state would finally have found a way to chill the
NAACP members’ freedom of association either by revealing their
membership in the organization or by showing that the NAACP had
members who also happened to be alleged subversives.135
In both cases, the Court in conference voted 5-4 against
the NAACP’s claim that its members’ First Amendment rights were
impermissibly infringed.136 Justice Frankfurter’s rationale for
no longer treating NAACP cases as exceptions to his generally
deferential stance was straightforward. In his view, the
statute in Button was not “aimed at the Negroes as such” and he
could not “imagine a worse disservice than to continue being the
guardians of the Negroes.”137 “Colored people are now people of
131

L. Powe, supra note 49, at 170; The Supreme Court, 1962
Term – Leading Cases, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 81, 122 (1963).
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L. Powe, supra note 49, at 171.
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372 U.S. 539 (1963). See infra text accompanying note
146 (explaining why the case’s decision date is 1963, rather
than 1961, and why the NAACP won rather than lost). Gibson is
tellingly discussed in M. Klarman, supra note 98, at 339; L.
Powe, supra note 49, at 169-71.
134

Gibson, 372 U.S. at 541 (internal quotation marks
omitted). See also id. at 543 (refusal to identify 14 persons
“previously identified as communists or members of communist
front or affiliated organizations” as NAACP members).
135

Gibson, 372 U.S. at 547-549, 555-57; L. Powe, supra
note 49, at 155-56 (describing the case’s potential result as
“every segregationist’s dream”); The Supreme Court, 1962 Term –
Leading Cases, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 81, 120 (1963);
136

D. Dickson, supra note 127, at 317-18 (giving the date
of the conference as Nov. 10, 1961).
137

D. Dickson, supra note 127, at 317 (conference notes).
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substance.
said.138

Colored people now have responsible positions,” he

Justice Harlan, in turn, cast his vote to uphold the
statutes because he believed both states had shown all the
Constitution required: that the challenged “regulation has a
reasonable relationship to a proper governmental objective and
does not unduly interfere with ... individual rights.”139
Harlan’s view “came straight from his normal First Amendment
stance: Interests must be balanced with a heavy hand placed on
the state’s side.”140
Harlan’s vote in the Virginia case is particularly telling
that the deferential minority’s putative exception for NAACP
cases was over. Harlan, unlike Frankfurter, acknowledged that
Virginia’s “law was aimed at the NAACP” because of “the school
problem.”141 Still, he concluded the “state has that right”
because it “applies in its statute the proper standards for law
practice.”142 Clearly, Harlan, who as much as any Justice at
that time should be identified with opinions employing the
compelling state interest standard,143 found that the balance of
138

D. Dickson, supra note 127, at 317-18. Other members
of the Court had similar qualms, M. Klarman, supra note 98, at
337, reflecting a concern that, as “an Arkansas jurist” said,
the Court had become “‘the guardian for the NAACP.’” Id. at 335.
139

NAACP, 372 U.S. at 454 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See
also id at 453 (“general regulatory statutes” may burden First
Amendment rights “when they have been found justified by
subordinating valid governmental interests”); Gibson, 372 U.S.
at 578-80 (Harlan, J., dissenting). I am using the dissent
Justice Harlan eventually wrote to indicate his rationale when
he voted in conference with what was then the deferential
majority. See infra text accompanying note 146 (discussing the
shift in majority and minority personnel).
140

L. Powe, supra note 49, at 219.

141

D. Dickson, supra note 127, at 318

142

D. Dickson, supra note 127, at 318

143

Harlan joined Frankfurter’s Sweezy concurrence, supra
text accompanying note 76, wrote Patterson, supra note
accompanying note 120, and joined Stewart’s opinion for the
Court in Bates, supra note accompanying note 122. See also
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interests favored the government whenever its “regulation[s]
ha[ve] a reasonable relationship to a proper governmental
objective and does not unduly interfere with individual
rights.”144 That was his test, and perhaps it was all he ever
meant by saying the government needed a “subordinating interest”
that was “compelling.”145
C.

Third Time’s a Charm

Only a number of fortuities saved the NAACP and breathed
life into Sweezy’s compelling state interest standard.146 Before
either decision was final, Justice Whittaker resigned for health
reasons. Whittaker’s resignation changed the vote to a 4-4 tie,
and both cases were returned to the Court’s calendar for
reargument in the 1962 Term. Then in the summer of 1962,
Justice Frankfurter suffered a stroke and retired. President
Kennedy selected Byron White to fill Whittaker’s seat and
appointed Arthur Goldberg to the second vacancy. Goldberg
proved to be a reliable vote in favor of First Amendment values.
High-protectionists now dominated the Court.
The last fortuity was how the new majority developed the
law to implement its high-protectionist vision of the First
Amendment. Justices Black and Douglas were First Amendment
absolutists who spurned any balancing approach to the Bill of
Rights.147 Their approach, however, had little appeal in the

Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (stating the compelling interest standard). He also
joined Brennan’s opinion in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958), which is discussed infra text accompanying notes 151-52.
144

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 454 (1963) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (speaking of cases that did not involve “speech
alone”).
145

NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463
(1958) (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957)).
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For the remarks in this paragraph, see M. Horwitz,
Warren, supra note 31, at 65-66; L. Powe, supra note 49, at 205,
209-10.
147

See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
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wider legal culture.148 Chief Justice Warren typically was not
too concerned with the jurisprudence he used to reach the
constitutionally correct decision, by which he meant the “fair”
result.149 By default, as well as by temperament, it fell to
Justice Brennan to develop the doctrinal structure that would
reach First Amendment friendly results through a generally
acceptable jurisprudence.
The “compelling state interest” doctrine, it turns out, was
congenial to Justice Brennan. Part of its appeal was that, as a
balancing test, it mediated the “deadlock” between the Court’s
deferential-balancing and absolutist camps.150 On the one hand,
as a form of balancing, the compelling interest standard
recognized that constitutional rights could be subordinated to
governmental needs in a particular case. On the other hand,
Justice Brennan recognized that if the compelling standard could
be such a rigorous criterion that its application in almost all
cases upheld First Amendment claims without the need for
additional weighing of interests in the particular case. If
applied by high-protectionists, the gap between the government’s
asserted interest and a stringent “compelling interest”
requirement was so vast as to enable a ruling favorable to First
Amendment values through a seemingly nondiscretionary
application of a pre-existing rule to the facts at bar.
Brennan had been using the compelling interest standard
since shortly after the Sweezy decision. In 1958, in writing
for the Court in Speiser v. Randall,151 Brennan mentioned the
“compelling” standard in passing in ruling that California had
adopted a procedurally defective means to limit its veterans’
148

See, e.g., M. Shapiro, supra note 49, at 87; Frantz,
supra note 111, at 1435-38; Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of
the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 Cal. L. Rev.
821, 825 (1962); Strong, supra note 111, at 59 (commenting that
critics of balancing also rejected “Black’s absolutist
approach”). But see for its support.
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See, e.g., Ed Cray, Chief Justice 11 (1997); G. Edward
White, Earl Warren: A Public Life 228 (1982); Mark Tushnet,
Themes in Warren Court Biographies, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 748, 767
(1995).
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M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 68.
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357 U.S. 513 (1958).
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property tax exemption to “loyal” veterans.152 In 1961, arguing
in dissent in Braunfeld v. Brown153 that Sunday closing laws
violated the free exercise rights of Orthodox Jews, Brennan used
the compelling interest standard in a way that anticipated its
future stringency.154 First he quoted Justice Jackson’s classic
statement in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette155 that
The right of the state to regulate, for example, a public
utility may well include ... power to impose all the
restrictions which a legislature may have a “rational
basis” for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press,
of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such
slender grounds. They are susceptible of restrictions only
to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which
the state may lawfully protect.156
152

Speiser, 357 U.S. at 529. Today Speiser is regarded as
the origin of the modern “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine,
see E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 535, 946 (classic
decision); Charles Bogle, “Unconscionable” Conditions, 94 Colum.
L. Rev. 193, 200 n. 27 (1994) (origin); Kathleen Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413, 1433 (1989)
(seminal decision). It is also regarded as the case to which
the First Amendment “chilling effect” doctrine and burden
shifting in strict scrutiny traces. See L. Powe, supra note 49,
at 136 (discussing “chilling effect” and burden shifting). The
future significance of the case was not immediately apparent.
See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1957 Term – Leading Cases, 72
Harv. L. Rev. 98, 188 (1958) (commenting that the opinion left
open the substantive question of whether the loyalty oath was
permissible if the procedures were corrected); L. Powe, supra
note 49, at 135 (describing Speiser as a “case[] of no immediate
significance”).
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366 U.S. 599, 610 (1961) (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
154

Professor Powe describes Braunfeld as reflecting
Brennan’s “emerging” jurisprudence. L. Powe, supra note 49, at
185.
155
156

319 U.S. 624 (1943).

Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 612 (1961) (Brennan,
J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). Erasing a dozen
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Then he asked:
What, then, is the compelling state interest which impels
the [state] to impede appellants’ freedom of worship? What
overbalancing need is so weighty in the constitutional
scale that it justified this substantial, though indirect,
limitation on appellant’s freedom?157
Brennan’s answer was that there was none. In thrashing out
that answer, Brennan noted that Sunday closing laws did promote
valid state interests. It was “convenien[t],” he admitted, for
“everyone to rest on the same day.”158 He allowed, also, that
“granting ... an exemption would make Sundays a little noisier,
and the task of police and prosecutor a little more
difficult.”159 Still, in Brennan’s view, these interests were
not “high enough to justify”160 the “substantial”161 burden on
“non-Sunday observers.”162
In 1963, in writing for the Court’s new majority in NAACP
v. Button,163 the first of the two re-argued cases to be decided,
Brennan reiterated the approach of his Braunfeld dissent.164 In
years of Supreme Court precedent, Brennan claimed that “[t]his
exacting standard has been consistently applied by this Court as
the test of legislation under all clauses of the First
amendment.” Id.
157

Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 613-14 (Brennan, J., concurring
and dissenting).
158

Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 614 (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
159

Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 614 (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
160

Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 615-16 (Brennan, J., concurring
and dissenting).
161

Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 616.
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Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 615.
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371 U.S. 415 (1963).

164

Professor Powe has also noted that the decision in the
two re-argued cases involved a shift from deferential balancing
36

Button, Brennan conceded that Virginia had a “valid ...
interest”165 in regulating the legal profession, but he insisted
that
The decisions of this Court, have consistently held that
only a compelling state interest in the regulation of a
subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate
can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms.166
Thus Virginia’s interest in regulating the legal profession,
particularly the “traditionally illegal practices of barratry,
maintenance and champerty,”167 was unavailing because Virginia
had not demonstrated “a serious danger ... of professionally
reprehensible conflicts of interest which rules against
solicitation frequently seek to prevent.”168
Sensing that the Court was headed in a new direction in
Button, Harlan entered a long, impassioned dissent for himself
and Justices Clark and Stewart, the remaining members of the
former majority.169 The gist of Harlan’s dissent was that “a
to a stringent compelling state interest test. L. Powe, supra
note 49, at 221. The Harvard Law Review immediately noticed a
heightening of judicial review. See The Supreme Court, 1962
Term – Leading Cases, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 81, 122 (1963)
(suggesting that “associational interests will be weighted more
heavily in the future and that legislative motives may be
subject to close judicial scrutiny”).
165

Button, 371 U.S. at 439.

166

Button, 371 U.S. at 438. See also id. at 439 (quoting
Bates v. Arkansas, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) that “[w]here there
is significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may
prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is
compelling”). See supra text accompanying notes 122-26
(discussing Bates).
167

Button, 371 U.S. at 439.

168

Button, 371 U.S. at 443.

169

Button, 371 U.S. at 448-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice White concurred and dissented, finding much in common
with Justice Harlan. Id. at 447-48 (White, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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sufficiently compelling subordinating state interest has been
shown to justify Virginia’s ... regulation”170 because all the
Constitution required was that “the particular regulation ...
ha[ve] a reasonable relation to the furtherance of a proper
state interest, and [that] ... that interest outweighs any
foreseeable harm to the furtherance of protected freedoms.”171
Harlan was voicing the now supplanted deferential balancing
approach to First Amendment problems.
The new majority’s decision in the second of the two reargued cases, Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigative
Committee,172 was cut from the same cloth as Button. The opinion
was written by Justice Goldberg, the Court’s most junior member.
At the outset of his analysis, Goldberg laid out the
Constitution’s requirements as he understood them:
[I]t is an essential prerequisite to the validity of an
investigation which intrudes into the area of
constitutional protected rights of speech, press,
association, and petition that the State convincingly show
a substantial relation between the information being sought
and a subject of overriding and compelling state
interest.173
He then “assum[ed]” that the prior legislative investigation
cases, which included Upaus v. Wyman174 and Barenblatt v. United
States,175 were correctly decided, but distinguished them on the
170

Button, 371 U.S. at 452 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(reviewing the majority’s conclusion).
171

Button, 371 U.S. at 455 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See
also id. at 454 (saying indirect regulation of First Amendment
freedoms “will be sustained if the regulation has a reasonable
relationship to a proper governmental objective and does not
unduly interfere with such individual rights”).
172

372 U.S. 539 (1963).
after Button.
173
174

Gibson was handed down two months

Gibson, 372 U.S. 546.

360 U.S. 72 (1959).
101-05 (discussing Uphaus).

See supra text accompanying notes

175

360 U.S. 109 (1959). See supra text accompanying notes
106-12 (discussing Barenblatt).
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unconvincing ground that they involved uncovering whether an
individual was a member of the Communist Party, not whether
individual communists were members of an otherwise legitimate
organization.176 He then held that the
record in this case is insufficient to show a substantial
connection between the ... NAACP and Communist activities
... which is an essential prerequisite to demonstrating the
immediate, substantial, and subordinating state interest
necessary to sustain its right of inquiry into the
membership lists of the association.177
And he concluded:
The ... Committee has failed to demonstrate the compelling
and subordinating government interest essential to support
direct inquiry into the membership records of the NAACP.178
Once again, Justice Harlan issued a rejoinder for himself
and the remaining deferential Justices.179 Harlan thought that
cases like Uphaus and Barenblatt should govern because he saw no
difference between investigations involving “Communist
infiltration of organizations and Communist activity by
organizations.”180 He concluded, a bit wearily, with the
deferential jurists’ mantra that:
There can be no doubt that the judging of challenges
respecting legislative or executive investigations in this
176

Gibson, 372 U.S. 547-48. See also L. Powe, supra note
49, at 221 (saying Harlan was “correct” in stating that “the
Court’s reasoning is difficult to grasp); The Supreme Court
Term, 1962 Term – Leading Cases, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 81, 120-21
(1963) (critiquing Justice Goldberg’s decision).
177

Gibson, 372 U.S. at 551.
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Gibson, 372 U.S. at 557. Justices Douglas and Black
concurred on absolutist grounds. Gibson, 360 U.S. at 558
(Black, J., concurring); id. at 559 (Douglas, J., concurring).
179

Gibson, 372 U.S. at 576 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice White joined Harlan’s opinion but also dissented
separately. Id. at 583 (White, J., dissenting).
180

Gibson, 372 U.S. at 579 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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sensitive area demands the utmost circumspection on the
part of courts .... But this surely carries with it the
reciprocal responsibility of respecting legitimate state
and local authority in this field. With all respect, I
think that in deciding this case as it has the Court has
failed to keep in mind that responsibility.181
Two months after Gibson, whatever doubt might exist that
the Court had entered a new era and that the “compelling state
interest” requirement was being taken up by the new majority in
earnest was erased by Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court in
Sherbert v. Verner.182 Sherbert voided, on free exercise
grounds, South Carolina’s denial of unemployment compensation to
a Seventh-day Adventist who refused to work on Saturday, which
was her Sabbath. Although Justice Brennan distinguished
Braunfeld v. Brown,183 his analysis was a stunning departure from
the approach that had governed that case. Sherbert made
Brennan’s Braunfeld dissent the law of the land.
Just like Braunfeld, Sherbert involved a general law that
promoted secular objectives but whose application in the
particular case incidentally burdened religious practice. In
Braunfeld, six Justices held that indirect burdens on religion
required only reasonable basis review.184 In Sherbert, Brennan,
joined by five other Justices, employed the compelling state
interest test to void the law.185 In his opinion, after
181

Gibson, 372 U.S. at 582-83 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408. The concurring and
dissenting Justices mentioned Braunfeld. The dissenting
Justices found Brennan’s distinction insupportable, id. at 421
(Harlan, J., dissenting). So did Justice Stewart, who concurred
only in the result and urged that Braunfeld be overruled, id. at
at 417 (Steward, J., concurring). See also L. Powe, supra note
49, at 370-71 (discussing the relation of the two cases).
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Braunfeld, 366 U.S. 599, 600 (1961) (opinion by Warren
joined by Black, Clark, and Whittaker); McGowan v. Maryland, 466
U.S. 420, 459 (1961) (concurrence by Frankfurter, joined by
Harlan, applies to Braunfeld was well).
185

Sherbert, 372 U.S. at 403, 406. Justices Douglas and
Stewart concurred without indicating their agreement with
Brennan’s standard. Id. at 410 (Douglas, J., concurring); id.
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determining that Sherbert’s free exercise rights were
significantly burdened,186 Justice Brennan asserted:
We must next consider whether some compelling state
interest ... justified the substantial infringement of
appellant’s First Amendment right. It is basic that no
showing of a rational relationship to some colorable state
interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive
constitutional area, “[o]nly the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interest, give occasion for
permissible limitation.”187
In applying this stringent standard, Brennan not only found that
“[n]o such abuse or danger has been advanced in the present
case,” but he also declared that even if there were “it would
plainly be incumbent upon the [State] to demonstrate that no
alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without
infringing First Amendment rights.”188 Sherbert was the first
clear, succinct, and complete statement of what constitutional
lawyers have come to mean by the phrase “strict scrutiny.”189
at 413 (Stewart, J., concurring in result). Why Justice Black,
who preferred an absolutist approach, and Justice Clark, who
tended to be a low-protectionist, joined Brennan’s majority
opinion is not clear.
186

Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-06.

187

Sherbert, 372 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
188
189

Sherbert, 372 U.S. at 407.

Although strict scrutiny became a majority-backed
doctrine of First Amendment law in 1963, it was just one of the
many techniques by which the Warren Court’s new majority’s
substantially heightened protections for First Amendment
liberties. Between 1964 and 1969, only a handful of First
Amendment cases relied on the compelling state interest test to
void governmental regulations. William v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,
31 (1968) (political association); DeGregory v. Attorney
General, 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966) (legislative investigation);
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1965)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (right of addressees to receive
communist propaganda). See also NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S.
118, 122 (1966) (Douglas, J., joined by Warren, C.J., Brennan,
J., and Fortas, J., dissenting from cert. denial); U.S. v.
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III. The Spread of the Compelling State Interest Test
and Strict Scrutiny
With Sherbert’s stunning departure from Braunfeld, the
compelling state interest test’s and strict scrutiny’s long
birthing process came to an end. After Sherbert, the compelling
state interest standard and strict scrutiny began to spread
beyond the First Amendment, the situs of their gestation and
birth, into equal protection analysis. Their spread, however,
was surprisingly slow, given the conventional understanding that
traces strict scrutiny back to Skinner v. Oklahoma190 and
Korematsu v. United States191 and sees that doctrine as
underlying the Court’s landmark voting rights and racial
discrimination precedents, Reynolds v. Sims192 and McLaughlin v.
Florida,193 in 1964.194
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (discussing but rejecting
using the compelling standard to decide symbolic speech cases)
In other words, beginning in 1963, strict scrutiny was a
part of the Court’s First Amendment toolkit, but rarely was the
tool of choice. The prominent place of strict scrutiny in First
Amendment law is a consequence of its having become prominent
elsewhere, and then, like the prodigal son, returning to the
land of its birth. The prominent use of strict scrutiny in
First Amendment analysis dates from the mid-1970s. See First
Nat. Bk. of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786, 795 (1978);
Buckley v. Veleo, 424 U.S. 1, 66, 74-75 (1976). Consider that
the centrally important “content-based / content-neutral”
distinction, with the compelling state interest standard applied
to the former but not the latter, is commonly traced back to
Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). But Mosely
employs strict scrutiny as part of an equal protection, not
First Amendment, analysis.
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316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).

191

323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).

192

377 U.S. 533 (1964) (voting rights), discussed infra
text accompanying note 231.
193

379 U.S. 184 (1964) (racial classification), discussed
infra text accompanying notes 236, 241-46 and n. 231 .
194

See, e.g., See, e.g., Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
223 (1995) (associating McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
42

In fact, after strict scrutiny’s appearance in the First
Amendment in 1963, its various branches migrated piecemeal into
the Equal Protection Clause. The compelling state interest
test, which was the last branch of strict scrutiny to make the
move, was not employed in equal protection analysis until
1969.195 When the compelling interest standard appeared in the
Equal Protection Clause, it was in fundamental rights cases. It
was not used in racial discrimination cases for another decade.
A.

Strict Scrutiny in Name Only

Strict scrutiny traces back to Skinner v. Oklahoma196 in
name only. Although Skinner used the term “strict scrutiny,” it
employed an analysis that we would call “minimal scrutiny with
bite.”197 In Skinner, Justice Douglas straightforwardly
determined that the classification at bar, which had the effect
of sterilizing recidivist chicken thieves but not recidivist
embezzlers, did not have a rational basis.198 His strict
scrutiny analysis made no mention of any requirement of burden
shifting, narrow tailoring, or a compelling state interest.
Korematsu’s relation to the development of strict scrutiny
is more complex. In Korematsu, Justice Black famously said not
only that racial classifications “are immediately suspect” and
“subject to the most rigid scrutiny,” but allowed that
“[p]ressing public necessity may sometimes justify” them.199
This intimates that, like in modern strict scrutiny, an
exceedingly important state interest may outweigh the Fourteenth
(1964) with strict scrutiny); Exxon v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176,
195 (1983) (same); Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 519 (1973)
(tracing the compelling state interest standard back to Reynold
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) for voting rights, and to
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) for racial
classifications).
195

See infra text accompanying notes 265-77.

196

316 U.S. 353, 541 (1942).

197

See supra text accompanying note 26 (describing minimal
scrutiny with bite).
198

Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538-39.

199

Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
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Amendment’s ban on racial discrimination. Black never defined
the notion of “[p]ressing public necessity” with greater
precision. Most likely, if Black had elaborated on its meaning
he would have pointed to the clear and present danger test.
That is the test Justice Murphy, in dissent, expressly imposed
on the government and said it had failed to meet.200
Perhaps Black’s intimation in Korematsu that the state had
a higher burden of justification was of no moment. The analysis
he employed in the case was a form of rational basis review that
was exceedingly deferential to the military’s claims.201 In
large measure, Korematsu was predicated on Hirabayashi v. United
States202 which was decided on rational basis grounds.203 In
Korematsu, Black neither placed the burden of proof on the
government nor required that its internment order be narrowly
tailored. Although he intimated a heightened state interest
requirement for racial classifications, he entirely deferred to
the government’s assertion that it was met.204
200

Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting)
(“The judicial test of whether the Government, on a plea of
military necessity, can validly deprive an individual of any of
his constitutional rights is whether the deprivation is
reasonably related to a public danger that is so ‘immediate,
imminent, and impending' as not to admit of delay and not to
permit the intervention of ordinary constitutional processes to
alleviate the danger”). On the prominence of the “clear and
present danger” test as the 1940s paradigmatic stringent
standard, see Mendelson, Clear, supra note 52, at 320-28, 332;
Siegel, Death, supra note 17, at *.
201

See David Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme
Court: The Second Century, 1888-1986, at 292 & 292 n. 98 (1990)
(saying Black’s scrutiny in Korematsu was quite deferential to
the military).
202

320 U.S. 81 (1943).

203

Id. at 101. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218-19; id. at
224 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“I am unable to see how the
legal considerations that led to the decision in ... Hirabayashi
... fail to sustain the military order which made the conduct
now in controversy a crime”).
204

Klarman, Interpretive, supra note 10, at 232.
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Then again, perhaps Black’s intimation had greater
significance. Black’s Korematsu intimation had an echo, four
years later, in Oyama v. California.205 Oyama involved a
California statutory presumption that discriminated against
Japanese-Americans. The presumption was a prophylactic rule
that helped enforce the state’s ban on alien land ownership.206
In Oyama, the Court assumed that the anti-alien land ownership
law was legitimate, and seemed to accept that the prophylactic
rule was a rational means to enforce it.207 Nevertheless, the
Court voided the rule. In writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Vinson alluded, without citation, to Black’s Korematsu
intimation, saying “we start with the proposition that only the
most exceptional circumstances can excuse discrimination” on
“the basis of ... racial descent.”208 Then he explain the
prophylactic rule’s invalidity on the grounds that:
In the light most favorable to the State, this case
presents a conflict between the State's right to formulate
a policy of landholding within its bounds and the right of
American citizens to own land anywhere in the United
States. When these two rights clash, the rights of a
citizen may not be subordinated merely because of his
father's country of origin.209

205

332 U.S. 633 (1948).

206

California law prohibited aliens who were ineligible
for citizenship from owning land. At the time of the case,
Japanese were the most prominent of a small group of aliens who
were ineligible for American citizenship. The prophylactic
presumption was that a transaction was made to evade the ban on
alien land ownership if it resulted (1) in a citizen who was a
child (2) receiving land paid for by his or her parents (3) when
his or her parents were aliens ineligible to own land
themselves. Id. at 635-44.
207

Id. at 646. See also id. at 684-86 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting). But see id. at 663 (Murphy, J., concurring)
(attacking the prophylactic rule’s rationality because “it stems
directly from racial hatred and intolerance”).
208

Id. at 646.

209

Id. at 647.
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Oyama was a balancing-of-interests decision that voided a
racial classification, not because its basis was irrational, but
because it was of insufficient weight to “subordinate” the
“right of American citizens to own land anywhere in the United
States.”210 Oyama required the state to have more than a
rational basis for discriminating among its citizens on the
basis of race.211
In light of Oyama, perhaps Black’s Korematsu intimation may
be explained by acknowledging that during the time that the
civil libertarian quartet of Black, Douglas, Murphy, and
Rutledge sat on the bench, there was some drift toward
heightening the state’s burden of justification in racial
classification cases.212 If so, that development would parallel
and reflect (though very slightly) the civil libertarians
influence on First Amendment jurisprudence.213 It may be that
during the 1940s, there was some movement toward according the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of freedom from invidious
racial discrimination sufficient weight to prevent it from being
210

Id.

211

But see Klarman, Interpretive, supra note 10, at 235-36
(explaining Oyama on the ground that it involved the right to
own property, which was a fundamental right, and although the
pre-Brown Court did not ban racial classifications generally, it
did ban them in the limited area of fundamental rights).
Professor Klarman reads Oyama as not applicable to racial
classifications generally. While significant, Klarman’s
limitation does not fully account for Black’s “pressing
necessities” comment in Korematsu which Chief Justice Vinson
alludes to as the basis for the ruling in Oyama. Korematsu did
not involve a fundamental right.
212

See M. Urofsky, supra note 4, at 16-18, 21-26, 28-29
(discussing the liberalism of these Justices); Craig Green,
Wiley Rutledge, Executive Detention, and Judicial Conscience at
War, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. ___ (2006, forthcoming) (available at
SSRN_ID905587_code497260.pdf.) (discussing Rutledge’s civil
libertarianism).
213

M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 56 (discussing
the influence of these Justices on the First Amendment in the
1940s)
Mendelson, Clear, supra note 52, at 320-28 (same); Siegel,
Death, supra note 17, at *.
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“subordinated merely because” the state was pursuing a
legitimate goal.214
Nevertheless, any intimation that the government faced a
heightened burden of justification in racial classification
cases disappeared in 1949 when Murphy and Rutledge died and
power on the Court passed to more deferential Justices.215 After
their death, although the Court did not forget that racial
classifications were “constitutionally suspect,”216 it ceased
demanding more than that a state, in enacting a racial
classification, pursue a legitimate end through reasonable
means.217
The NAACP understood the deferential stance of the Court’s
dominant Justices in the 1950s. Its argument in Brown v. Board
of Education presumed that segregation was justified if it was a
reasonable means to promote a permissible state end.218 In 1954,
the Court momentously ruled that “[s]egregation in public
education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental
objective.”219 Over the next decade, in a series of Per Curiam
214

Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948).

215

M. Horwitz, supra note 31, at 56 (discussing the new
Justices Clark and Minton); Mendelson, Clear, supra note 52, at
328 (same).
216

Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).

217

See, e.g., Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499-500 (quoted infra
text accompanying note 219); Klarman, Interpretive, supra note
10, at 227, 229-30, 232-40 (saying that in the 1940s, the
general thinking of the Court, even in racial classification
cases, was the Equal Protection Clause required that government
action be a reasonable means to promote a legitimate state end
except where a limited group of fundamental rights were
concerned). Note also that between 1948 and 1964, the Court
never mentioned that it reviewed racial classifications using
“rigid” scrutiny. “Strict scrutiny” was mentioned only once, in
Justice Harlan’s dissent to Poe v. Ullman, 363 U.S. 497, 548
(1961), which was a substantive due process case.
218

Klarman, Interpretive, supra note 10, at 233 n. 86
(citing Richard Kluger, Simple Justice 671-72, 674 (1976).
219

Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
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opinions, the Court extended that judgment to a wide variety of
governmental activities, actions and regulations.220
Thus, until 1964, the Court’s remarkable achievement in
overturning the system of Jim Crow legislation followed from a
shift in the universe of legitimate state goals and permissible
means recognized by the Court. Although at the time the Court
was coy about it,221 with hindsight it is fair to say that before
1954 racial segregation was a reasonable means to pursue
legitimate state ends; after 1954 it was not. With that shift
in the universe of licit ends and means, the court was able to
strike down racial segregation without changing burden of proof
requirements, insisting on narrow tailoring, or demanding a
compelling state interest. It could void race-based segregation
based on the simple truth that those laws were not “reasonably
related to any proper governmental objective.”222 All those
cases were rational basis, not strict scrutiny, overrulings.223

220

Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (public records);
Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (court room seating);
New Orleans Parks Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (public
parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (city buses);
Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (public golf
courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955)
(public beaches and bathhouses).
221

See Siegel, Equality, supra note 23, at 1481-84
(discussing the post-Brown rulings).
222

Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). See also
Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (per curiam reversal
of contempt of court conviction for refusing to comply with
segregated seating arrangement of a court room, saying simply “a
State may not constitutionally require segregation of public
facilities”).
223

See, e.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per
curiam reversal of contempt of court conviction where on ground
that “it is no longer open to question that a State may not
constitutionally require segregation of public facilities”);
Klarman, Interpretive, supra note 10, at 226-27, 238-43
(discussing absence of rule that racial classifications were
“presumptively unconstitutional” before 1964).
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B.

Heightened But Not Strict Scrutiny

The Court did not attempt more until 1964, the year after
strict scrutiny was established in its First Amendment cases.
And even when, in 1964, the Court began to import strict
scrutiny analysis into equal protection, its progress was slow
and piecemeal. Strict scrutiny’s slow spread into equal
protection is readily apparent if we recall that strict scrutiny
is but one of a number of distinct forms of intensified
review,224 and that strict scrutiny contains three branches:
burden shifting, compelling state interest, and narrow tailoring
requirements.225
Thus, when the new Warren Court majority emerged in 1963,
it had in its jurisprudential toolkit a number of analytic
approaches and doctrines with which to increase the Court’s
protection of constitutional norms in equal protection cases.
It could, for example, create stringent rules, consider whether
government action rationally advanced legitimate state ends, and
demand that government action be narrowly tailored to achieve a
permissible purpose.226 It could also simply employ a general
balancing approach to adjudicating the clashing interests
involved in Equal Protection litigation.227 All this was in
addition to the possibility of requiring, as it had just done in
the First Amendment cases of Button, Gibson, and Sherbert, that
the government’s action promote a compelling state interest.228
224

See supra text accompanying note 24-34 (discussing the
forms of heightened scrutiny).
225

See supra text accompanying note 35-48 (discussing
strict scrutiny).
226

There are, of course, many other techniques for
enhancing constitutional protections, including interpreting
statutes to avoid burdening favored rights. See, e.g., Ex Parte
Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 299-301 (1944); Mendelson, Clear, supra note
52, at 321 (discussing the First Amendment).
227

See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the
Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L.J. 943 (1987) (discussing balancing
in constitutional law); Developments, supra note 41, at 1103-04,
1122-23 (discussing Equal Protection cases).
228

See supra text accompanying notes 163-89 (discussing
Button, Gibson, and Sherbert).
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Between 1964 and 1968, the new majority drew on many of
these approaches and doctrines in ramping up the Equal
Protection Clause to give ever increasing protection to
constitutional values.229 In Reynolds v. Sims,230 for example,
the Court created a new stringent rule, the requirement of “one
person, one vote” to adjudicate the constitutionality of
population disparities among legislative districts.231 In Harper
v. Virginia State Board of Elections,232 the Court struck down
the century old institution of conditioning the right to vote on
the payment of poll taxes, arguing that since “[w]ealth ... is
not germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the
electoral process,”233 taxing the right to vote had “no relation”
to any legitimate public purpose.234 And in McLaughlin v.
229

The Court had been redeveloping the Equal Protection
clause from even before Earl Warren’s tenure. The point is that
after 1962, that development increases exponentially. See L.
Powe, supra note 49, at 202, 248, 262, 266, 288, 384, 449, 451
(recounting Warren Court’s equal protection rulings after 1963);
Klarman, Interpretive, supra note 10, at 250-82 (same).
230

373 U.S. 533 (1964).

231

For another example of the Court voiding state action
under the Equal Protection Clause using a stringent rule see
Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam reversal of
contempt of court conviction where on ground that “it is no
longer open to question that a State may not constitutionally
require segregation of public facilities”). See also Tancil v.
Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (summarily affirming Hamm v. Va. St.
Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp 156 (D.C.E.D. Va. 1964) which
voided racially separate voting and property assessment rolls on
grounds that “decisional law has made it axiomatic that no State
can directly dictate or casually promote a distinction in the
treatment of persons solely on the basis of their color”);
Klarman, Interpretive, supra note 10, at 254-57 (saying it was
in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) that the Court
finally adopted a rule that racial classifications were
presumptively invalid).
232

383 U.S. 663 (1966).

233

Harper, 383 U.S. at 668.

234

Harper, 383 U.S. at 666. See also id. at 670 (“wealth
or fee paying has, in our view, no relation to voting
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Florida,235 the Court ended the equally well-established
institution of punishing interracial fornication more heavily
than same-race fornication, reasoning that such laws were not
narrowly tailored. Even though the Court was willing to indulge
the assumption that differential punishment of interracial and
same-race fornication was “enacted pursuant to a valid state
interest,” it voided the law because it was not “necessary” to
the accomplishment of that permissible purpose.236
In no case, however, did the Court rely on the compelling
state interest standard. It would be inaccurate to say that, in
these years, the compelling state interest standard was entirely
absent from Equal Protection litigation. Only two months after
using the compelling state interest standard to decide the First
Amendment case, Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation
Committee,237 Justice Goldberg mentioned the compelling interest
standard when he wrote for the Court in Watson v. City of
Memphis.238 In Watson, Memphis argued that it could delay
desegregating its municipal recreation facilities because of
“good faith” fears of “interracial disturbances, violence,
riots, and community confusion and turmoil.”239 In beginning his
qualifications”). For another example of the Court voiding
state action under the Equal Protection Clause for the absence
of any rational relation to a legitimate state interest, see
Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73
(1968); Gunther, supra note 26, at 30-33 (discussing Glona).
235

379 U.S. 184 (1964).

236

McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 196. For other examples of the
Court voiding legislation under the Equal Protection Clause
because the law did not precisely target the evil it was
directed against, see Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94-97
(1965) (absolute prohibition of voting by military personnel who
live on bases in the state ruled invalid; state could have
adopted administrative procedures to determine which servicemen
and women were not bona fide residents).
237

372 U.S. 539 (1963).
172-81 (discussing Gibson).
238
239

See supra text accompanying notes

373 U.S. 526 (1963).

Watson, 373 U.S. at 535. Memphis relied on Brown v.
Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), for its argument that a
slow pace was permissible. Id. at 530-33. The Court
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opinion, Goldberg set the stage for a ruling against Memphis’s
plea by stating “The basic guarantees of our Constitution are
warrants for the here and now and, unless there is an
overwhelmingly compelling reason, they are to be promptly
fulfilled.”240
The following year, however, in McLaughlin v. Florida,241
the more conservative Justice White enunciated a standard whose
stringency was more ambiguous. At the outset of his opinion
striking down the state’s differential punishment of interracial
and same-race fornication, he said:
Our inquiry ... is whether there clearly appears in the
relevant materials some overriding statutory purpose
requiring the proscription of the specified conduct when
engaged in by a white person and a Negro, but not
otherwise.242
Three years later, in voiding anti-miscegenation laws in
Loving v. Virginia,243 Chief Justice Warren picked up Justice
White’s, not Justice Goldberg’s, turn of phrase, saying:
“[t]here is patently no legitimate overriding purpose
independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies
this classification.”244
These cases did not, however, establish the compelling
interest standard as part of equal protection analysis.
Goldberg’s comment in Watson and White’s and Warren’s remarks in
McLaughlin and Loving, were not the ratio decedendi of their
respective cases. Justice Goldberg mentioned the compelling
interest standard in his peroration in Watson, but he decided
the case by applying to the maxim “that constitutional rights
distinguished schools because of their complexity and treated
Brown as an “significant” departure from “the usual principle.”
Id at 532.
240

Watson, 373 U.S. at 533.

241

379 U.S. 184 (1964).

242

McLuaghlin, 379 U.S. at 192.

243

388 U.S. 1 (1967).

244

Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
52

may not be denied simply because of hostility to their
assertion.”245 Similarly, whatever Justice White meant by his
invocation of the ambiguous and inherently less stringent
“overriding” purpose requirement in McLaughlin, he decided the
case by holding:
There is involved here an exercise of the state police
power which trenches upon the constitutionally protected
freedom from invidious official discrimination based on
race. Such a law, even though enacted pursuant to a valid
state interest, bears a heavy burden of justification, as
we have said, and will be upheld only if it is necessary,
and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of
a permissible state policy.246
Loving is similar. Chief Justice Warren decided the case
on the rule, paraphrased from McLaughlin, that if
racial classifications in criminal statutes ... are ever to
be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the
accomplishment of some permissible state objective,
independent of the racial discrimination which it was the
object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate.247
He mentioned the “overriding purpose” standard only in passing.
It had no consequential role in disposing of the case.
Finally, it should be noted that Justice Harlan wrote a
special concurrence in McLaughlin stating his agreement with the
Court’s decision to import the First Amendment’s narrow
tailoring principle into racial discrimination cases.248 “The
necessity test,” he said,
245

Watson, 373 U.S. 535.

246

McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 196 (emphasis added).

247

Loving, 388 U.S. 11 (emphasis added). See also Note,
Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 Yale L.J. 1237,
1245-51 (1974) (saying Loving required only narrow tailoring and
a permissible state objective, and finding this consonant with
the Court’s other suspect classification cases).
248

McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 197 (emphasis supplied).
McLaughlin was the first time this had occurred. Previously,
whenever the Court had voided segregation statutes, it had done
so by finding that the statute did not pursue a legitimate state
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which developed to protect free speech against state
infringement should be equally applicable in a case
involving state racial discrimination – prohibition of
which lies at the very heart of the Fourteenth Amendment.249
Yet, there is nothing in Harlan’s thoughtful concurrence to
indicate that he understood that White’s opinion also imported
any other aspect of First Amendment law.
What, then, is the meaning of the Court’s occasional and
ambiguous statements, made in Watson, McLaughlin, and Loving,
that implied the state needed more than a merely legitimate
purpose to enact racial classifications or burden fundamental
interests? Perhaps it is best to rely on the conclusion reached
by the editors of the Harvard Law Review in their classic note,
“Developments in the Law – Equal Protection,” published in
March, 1969.250 Their encyclopedic and seminal project organized
and crystallized much of the Warren Court’s historic
transformation of the Equal Protection Clause.251 Their reading
of the cases certainly reflects informed contemporary
understanding. Moreover, their conclusion was reached without
the distorting influence of hindsight.
Although the editors treated Watson as an important
remedies case about the circumstances in which delaying
desegregation orders were appropriate,252 they never mentioned
Goldberg’s dicta regarding the compelling interest standard. In
contrast, they took McLaughlin and Loving as significant
statements of substantive law and treated them throughout their
interest. See, e.g, Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963)
(overturning contempt of court conviction for refusing to comply
with courtroom segregation); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960) (municipal boundary drawing with no discernible
purpose other than racial exclusion).
249

McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 197.

250

Developments, supra note 41.

251

It is one of the most cited student writings of all

time.
252

50.

See Developments, supra note 41, at 1139-40 nn. 43, 48,
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“Standards of Review” section.253 Focusing on McLaughlin, most
likely because it was the seminal precedent, the editors read
that case as suggesting both a narrow tailoring principle,254 and
a concern for whether
the public interest involved outweighs the detriments that
will be incurred by the affected private parties. In
calculating the magnitude of the public need for the
measure, the courts must consider both the extent of the
benefits accruing to society and the degree of risk which
will be incurred if a measure of that nature is not
permitted. Similarly, the actual cost of the measure must
be determined by examining both the importance of the
individual or group rights infringed and the extent to
which the measure will have long-term adverse effects on
those interests.255
Apparently, the editors understood McLaughlin’s “overriding
purpose” language as implicating a balancing approach to the
state’s burden of justification. Indeed, in analyzing the Equal
Protection Clause’s requirements for government action that
created suspect classifications or burdened fundamental
interests, the editors organized their discussion around three
strands: a search for a legitimate purpose,256 narrow
tailoring,257, and balancing.258 The editors never mentioned or
253

See, e.g., Developments, supra note 41, at 1076, 1081
nn. 24 & 26, 1090, 1091 n. 86, 1099 n. 132, 1102, 1124
(discussing and citing McLaughlin and Loving).
254

See Developments, supra note 41, at 1101-03 (discussing
and citing McLaughlin).
255

Developments, supra note 41, at 1103.

256

Developments, supra note 41, at 1091 (speaking of
“discriminatory purpose”).
257

Developments, supra note 41, at 1101, 1121 (speaking of
“relevance to purpose”).
258

Developments, supra note 41, at 1103, 1122. The
editors’ analysis parallels the strands of modern strict
scrutiny, see supra text text accompanying notes 35-37, except
that it substitutes balancing for the compelling interest
standard.
55

even hinted that strict scrutiny had a “compelling state
interest” requirement.259
In short, the Developments editors ignored Watson’s
substantive standard, and read McLaughlin’s “overriding purpose”
language as instantiating a balancing approach to the state’s
burden of justification. Theirs is a sensible reading
reflecting the understanding of their time. For decades, a
concern for whether the state, in burdening constitutional
rights, had an “overriding justification” was a staple of
balancing of interests jurisprudence.260 In addition, in Tancil
v. Woolls,261 the Court had upheld, without opinion, Virginia’s
legislation requiring that divorce records reflect the racial
heritage of the parties.262 The significance of that decision
was not lost on Justices Douglas and Stewart. When, in
259

The editors did say

It now seems doubtful that any objective short of the
exigencies of war-time emergency would justify the
imposition of any long-term burdens on a racial basis,
especially racial segregation. Indeed, even under crisis
conditions, it is not clear that a state would be permitted
to impose serious deprivations because of an individual's
race.
Developments, supra note 41, at 1090. But they saw this outcome
as a result of the balancing approach, not the compelling
interest standard.
260

See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525,
567 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (Commerce Clause
balancing); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 294 (1941)
(Frankfurter, J. dissenting) (First Amendment balancing).
261

379 U.S. 19 (1964) (Per Curiam).

262

See Hamm v. Virginia State Board of Election, 230 F.
Supp. 156, 158 (D.C.E.D.Va. (1964), upheld, sub nom. Tancil v.
Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (Per Curiam). See also, Washington
v. Lee, 263 F.Supp. 327 (D.C.M.D.Ala 1966), upheld sub nom. Lee
v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (Per Curiam) in which the
lower court struck down segregated prisons but allowed
segregation in “isolated instances,” such as Birmingham’s drunk
tank, where the need for “security and discipline necessitates
segregation.” Washington, 263 F.Supp. at 331.
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McLaughlin, they joined in a concurrence advocating a rule of
per se invalidity for racial classifications, Tancil drove them
to limit their suggestion to “criminal offense[s].”263
Balancing, not absolutism, seemed the order of the day.264
C.

Strict Scrutiny At Last

The Harvard Law Review editors’ reading of the course of
Equal Protection Clause litigation had a shelf life of one
month. In April, 1969 in Shapiro v. Thompson,265 the Supreme
Court struck down Connecticut’s and Washington, D.C.’s one-year
residency requirement for receiving welfare benefits. Writing
for the Court, Justice Brennan rejected the governments’
argument that their residency requirement rationally promoted
four legitimate state objectives.266 “But, of course,” Brennan
wrote,
the traditional criteria do not apply in these cases.
Since the classification here touches on the fundamental
right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be
judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a
compelling state interest.267
Indeed, “any classification which serves to penalize the
exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.”268
Brennan’s imposition of the compelling state interest
standard, along with the narrow tailoring requirement, through
the breezy and confident “[b]ut, of course” remark was belied,
263

McLaughlin, 379 U.S. 198 (1964).
U.S. at 13 (Stewart, J., concurring).
264

See also Loving, 388

See Developments, supra note 41, at 1090-91 (saying the
“overriding purpose” test rejects a “per se rule” and “will
allow the courts more flexibility in appraising measures which
have no discriminatory purpose”).
265

394 U.S. 618 (1969).

266

Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 633-64.

267

Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638.

268

Shapiro, 394 U.S. 634.
57

however, and its novelty was revealed by the fact that the
authority he cited for his proposition were four cases269 which
he introduced with the tellingly weak “Cf.” signal.270
Given the novelty of Justice Brennan’s doctrine, Justice
Stewart felt compelled to write a concurrence to specially
defend the proposition that the “purposes ... offered in support
of a law that so clearly impinges upon the constitutional right
of interstate travel must be shown to reflect a compelling
governmental interest.”271 Stewart was defending the doctrine
from the elaborate attack contained in Justice Harlan’s
dissent,272 and he drove his point home by quoting Harlan’s
opinion for the Court in the 1958 First Amendment case, NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson:273
As Mr. Justice Harlan wrote for the Court more than a
decade ago, ‘[T]o justify the deterrent effect ... on the
free exercise ... of their constitutionally protected right
269

The four cases were Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
406 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Sherbert and Bates, though of
recent vintage, were First Amendment cases. Korematsu and
Skinner, though equal protection cases, were not particularly
relevant, if only for the great hiatus between them and modern
activism. In addition, Skinner discussed neither narrow
tailoring nor a compelling interest requirement. See supra text
accompanying notes 196-98. On Korematsu, see supra text
accompanying notes 199-214.
270

“Cf.” means the cited “authority supports a proposition
different but sufficiently analogous to lend support.” The
Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation 47 (18th ed. 2005). It is
the weakest citation signal indicating support. Ira Robbins,
Semiotics, Analogical Legal Reasoning, and the Cf. Citation:
Getting Our Signals Uncrossed, 48 Duke L.J. 1043, 1045 (1999).
271

Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 643-44 (Stewart, J., concurring).

272

Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 642 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 655-77 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
273

357 U.S. 449 (1958). See supra text accompanying notes
119-24 (discussing Patterson).
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... a ... subordinating interest of the State must be
compelling.’
The Court today, therefore, is not ‘contriving new
constitutional principles.’ It is deciding these cases
under the aegis of established constitutional law.274
Two months later, the Court imported the compelling state
interest standard into equal protection cases involving voting
rights, Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.275 and Cipriano v. City
of Houma .276 From there its spread within equal protection
analysis, and throughout general legal consciousness, was
rapid.277
274

Shaprio, 394 U.S. at 644 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958)).
275

Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
In commenting on the Kramer case, the Harvard Law Review editors
observed that “[i]t might be argued Kramer is the first case
clearly to hold [voting rights] denials entail strict review”
because prior cases only “purported to use a strict standard.”
The Supreme Court, 1968 Term - Leading Cases, 83 Harv. L. Rev.
62, 83 n. 26 (1969).
276

Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).

277

To illustrate the spread, consider that prior to 1969,
the term “compelling state interest” had been used in no equal
protection cases and in only 6 cases, all of which involved the
First Amendment. Westlaw search using the string “compelling
state interest” & date(bef 1969). From 1969 to 1973, the term
“compelling state interest” was used in 26 equal protection, due
process, and first amendment cases. Westlaw search using the
string “compelling state interest” & date(aft 1968 & bef 1974).
Prior to 1969, the term “compelling governmental interest”
had been used in only 2 cases, both of which involved the First
Amendment. Westlaw search using the string “compelling state
interest” & date(bef 1969). From 1969 to 1973, the term
“compelling governmental interest” was used in 12 equal
protection, due process and equal protection cases. Westlaw
search using the string “compelling governmental interest” &
date(aft 1968 & bef 1974).
Prior to 1969, the term “compelling state interest” had
been used in the Harvard Law Review in only 7 articles and
59

Ironically, racial classification was perhaps the last area
of constitutional law expressly brought within the scope of the
compelling state interest standard.278 In 1974, a student note
in the Yale Law Journal maintained, accurately in my view, that
the compelling interest standard was not part of strict scrutiny
for suspect classifications.279 Not until Justice Douglas’s
dissent from the dismissal on mootness grounds of the Court’s
first affirmative action case did any Justice mention the
“compelling state interest” standard in a case involving racial
classification,280 and Douglas raised it only to argue that
adopting the standard would be unfortunate. As First Amendment
cases had shown, adopting the compelling, rather than an
absolute, standard would permit “those who hold the reins” to
give “constitutional guarantees” an undesirable “accordionlike
quality.”281 It was not until 1978, when affirmative action
returned to the Court, that a racial classification case was
decided by the principle that the government regulations must be

notes. Westlaw search using the string “compelling state
interest” & date(bef 1969). From 1969 to 1973, the term was
used in 31 articles and notes. Westlaw search using the string
“compelling state interest” & date(aft 1968 & bef 1974).
Prior to 1969, the term “compelling governmental interest”
had been used in the Harvard Law Review in only 1 note. Westlaw
search using the string “compelling governmental interest &
date(bef 1969). From 1969 to 1973, the term was used in 11
articles and notes. Westlaw search using the string “compelling
governmental interest” & date(aft 1968 & bef 1974).
278

The tradition of reading the compelling interest as
implicitly part of the law of race cases since Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), and voting cases since
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966)
may date from Justice Harlan’s dissent in Shaprio v. Thompson,
394 U.S. at 655 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing and quoting
Korematsu and Harper).
279

Note, Mental, supra note 247, at 1245-51.

280

DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 341, 343 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
281

DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 343 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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“precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest.”282
In that case, Justice Powell spoke only for himself, even
though he cast the deciding vote. Thus, it was not until 1984,
in Palmore v. Sidoti,283 that an opinion for the Court declared
that “to pass constitutional muster” racial classifications
“must be” both narrowly tailored and “justified by a compelling
governmental interest.”284
While not exactly the completion of the spread of the
“compelling state interest” standard – it took another five
years for the Court to decide to employ it in affirmative action
cases285 – Palmore does provide a convenient stopping point. By
282

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke v. 438
U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (per Powell, J.).
283

466 U.S. 429 (1984).

284

Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432. See also Crawford v. Bd. of
Educ. of the City of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527, 536 (1982)
(assuming racial classifications must promote a compelling state
interest); Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S.
457, 482 n. 28 (1982) (same). For the point that strict
scrutiny was not employed in racial classification cases prior
to the affirmative action cases consider that the typical list
of cases from the 1950s and 1960s that scholars cite as voiding
racial classifications on strict scrutiny grounds employed
neither narrow tailoring nor the compelling state interest
standard. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 4, at 1071 and n. 52
(citing cases).
Although alienage is frequently spoken of as a suspect
classification requiring strict scrutiny, see, e.g., Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971); E. Chemerinsky, supra note
2, at 739-43, the cases evidence a weaker standard. See, e.g.,
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (narrow tailoring and
“substantial” government interest); Examining Board v. Flores de
Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 602 (narrow tailoring and “substantial”
interest); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973) (narrow
tailoring and “substantial” interest, but saying that interest
has been described in various ways, such as “compelling,”
“important,” and “overriding”).
285

City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
Unlike Croson, Palmore, 466 U.S. at 429 involved an invidious
racial classification that burdened African-Americans.
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1984, the compelling state interest standard, and the strict
scrutiny analysis of which it was an important part, not only
were keystone doctrines of constitutional law, but finally were
part of the Equal Protection Clause’s analysis of invidious
racial classifications, which is where the conventional wisdom
assumes they started.286
IV.

The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and the
Purpose of Strict Scrutiny

Ever since the Supreme Court decided to subject affirmative
action legislation to strict scrutiny,287 there has been a stream
of articles analyzing how that decision has altered the nature
of this most stringent level of judicial review.288 One of the
most frequently made claims is that the Supreme Court’s
application of strict scrutiny to affirmative action has
compelled the Court to change strict scrutiny’s underlying
rationale.289
According to the Supreme Court, strict scrutiny has two
purposes. It is, first of all, a device to “smoke out” illicit
governmental motive. As Justice O’Connor has written:
286

For some discussion of the strict scrutiny’s subsequent
history, as well as the history of heightened scrutiny in the
Burger and Rehnquist courts, see Richard Brisbin, Jr. and Edward
Heck, The Battle Over Strict Scrutiny: Coalition Conflict in the
Rehnquist Court, 32 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1049 (1992); Ira Lupu,
Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 Mich. L.
Rev. 981, 998-1026 (1979).
287

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995); City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
288

E.g., Michelle Adams, Searching for Strict Scrutiny in
Grutter v. Bollinger, 78 Tul. L. Rev. 1941, 1945-54 (2004);
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Affirmative Action and Compelling Interests:
Equal Protection Jurisprudence at the Crossroads, 6 U. Pa. J.
Const. L. 260, 272-79 (2002); Pamela Karlan, Easing the Spring:
Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting
Cases, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1569, 1573-94 (2002); Massey, supra
note 3, at 975-80; Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 Yale
L.J. 427, 428, 436-44 (1997).
289

See infra text accompanying notes 292-95.
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the purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out"
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative
body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of
a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the
means chosen "fit" this compelling goal so closely that
there is little or no possibility that the motive for the
classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or
stereotype.290
290

City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
See also Johnson v. California, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 1142, 1146
(2005) (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (same); Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
225 (1995) (same).
As elaborated by Elena Kagan in the context of the First
Amendment speech clause, the argument is:
the strict scrutiny standard--indeed, each component of it- is best understood as an evidentiary device that allows
the government to disprove the implication of improper
motive .... This is true first of the compelling interest
requirement: the stronger the state interest asserted, the
more likely it is that the government would act to achieve
that interest in the absence of antipathy toward the
speech. Similar reasoning applies to the demand for close
tailoring. If a restriction applies to more speech than
necessary to achieve the interest asserted, the suspicion
deepens that the government is attempting to quash ideas as
ideas rather than to promote a legitimate interest. And if
a restriction applies to less speech than implicates the
asserted interest, so too the concern grows that the
interest asserted is a pretext. But if a restriction fits
along both dimensions--if it applies to all and also to
only the speech that threatens the asserted interest--then
there is an assurance that the government has acted for
proper reasons. In this way, the strict scrutiny test
operates as a measure of governmental motive. The showing
that the government must make under that standard does not
serve, as on a scale, to outweigh impermissible motive or
counter its harms. The showing instead serves an
evidentiary function: to disprove (again, of necessity
indirectly) the inference of bad motive that arises from
the ... face of a law.
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In addition, strict scrutiny is a tool to determine whether
there is a cost-benefit justification for governmental action
that burdens interests for which the Constitution demands
unusually high protection. Again, as Justice O’Connor has
written:
[W]henever the government treats any person unequally
because of his or her race, that person has suffered an
injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit
of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection ....
The application of strict scrutiny ... determines whether a
compelling governmental interest justifies the infliction
of that injury.291
Scholars agree that the Court has used strict scrutiny for
both these purposes.292 However, they see “smoking out” as
strict scrutiny’s original purpose and the cost-benefit
rationale as a recent shift in strict scrutiny’s underlying
principle brought about by the Court’s determination to subject
affirmative action legislation to its highest and most rigid
level of review.293 Scholars disagree on whether to condemn or
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of
Government Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 413, 453-54 (1996) (discussing strict scrutiny for First
Amendment liberties). See also, Rubenfeld, supra note 288, at
436 (discussing strict scrutiny for suspect classifications).
291

Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995). As restated
by Jed Rubenfeld, the Court’s position is that “strict scrutiny
can be justified ... as a justificatory test – a test measuring
whether ... constitutional costs are justified in a given case
by offsetting social benefits.” Rubenfeld, supra note 288, at
439. See also Adams, supra note 288, at 1943 (“balance society
benefits against potential societal harms that are created by an
affirmative action plan”).
292

E.g., Adams, supra note 288, at 1943; Kim Forde-Mazrui,
The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative
Action," 88 Geo. L.J. 2331, 2359-64 (2000); Rubenfeld, supra
note 288, at 428, 436-44.
293

Adams, supra note 288, at 1943-44 (discussing a shift
from an “antisubjugation” to an “antidiscrimination” rationale);
Rubenfeld, supra note 288, at 437-38. The view that discovery
of illicit motive is the original purpose of strict scrutiny
predates the controversy over its use in recent affirmative
64

commend this development.294 But whether they approve or
disapprove of the shift, scholars concur that “smoking out” was
the original raison d’etre of strict scrutiny and the
“balancing” approach is a recent shift.295
This Article shows, however, that strict scrutiny’s
development is more complex than the standard account. Tracing
the roots of strict scrutiny into the First Amendment when
balancing of interests was its paradigmatic form of legal
thought suggests that “cost-justification” was its original
point. Balancing of interests essentially is a jurisprudence of
cost-benefit analysis, not motive discovery. When the Court
introduced narrow tailoring and the compelling state interest
standard into First Amendment analysis, it did so as part of its
general “balancing / cost-benefit justification” approach to
First Amendment questions.296 Indeed, the Court’s more
absolutist Justices, Black and Douglas, concurred rather than
joined in some of the early decisions employing strict scrutiny
in the First Amendment because, in their view, no “objective can
ever be weighed against an express [constitutional] limitation
on the means available for its pursuit.”297
decisions. See Simon, supra note 4, at 1067-76 (saying strict
scrutiny is a system to discover improper motive).
294

See Adams, supra note 288, at 1946-47 (commending);
Forde-Mizrui, supra note 292, at 2363-64 (commending);
Rubenfeld, supra note 288, at 440 (condemning).
295

But see Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of “Benign”
Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 Colum. L. Rev.
559, 565 n. 41 (1975) (citing seminal strict scrutiny cases for
the proposition that “in some suspect classification cases, the
Court has weighed ends, even though it has not been explicit
about what it is doing”).
296

See Aleinikoff, supra note 227, at 966-67; Siegel,
Death, supra note 17, at * (discussing the cases); infra text
accompanying note 300 (discussing narrow tailoring and
Schneider).
297

Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee,
372 U.S. 539, 566 (1963) (Douglas J., concurring)(quoting
Frantz, supra note 111, at 1441). See also id. at 558 (Black,
J., concurring) (expressing agreement with Douglas’s opinion);
Bates v. Little Rock, 316 U.S. 516, 528 (Black, J., and Douglas,
J., concurring) (saying “First Amendment rights are beyond
65

Black and Douglas were correct to understand strict
scrutiny, when it was first formulated, as a form of costbenefit analysis. Consider, for example, Schneider v. Town of
Irvington,298 which is both a seminal First Amendment balancing
case299 and one of the cases that introduced narrow tailoring
into First Amendment analysis.300 Narrow tailoring was used in
Schneider for cost-justification purposes.301 In Schneider, the
abridgment”). Gibson, supra, is particularly important as it is
one of the seminal cases in which the new Warren Court majority
used a true strict scrutiny standard. See supra text
accompanying notes 172-81 (discussing Gibson).
See also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 197 (Stewart,
J., and Douglas, J., concurring) (objecting to the idea that
“some overriding statutory purpose” might validate a racial
classification); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 13 (Stewart,
J., concurring) (reiterating his McLaughlin concurrence)
298

308 U.S. 147 (1939).

299

Aleinikoff, supra note 227, at 966-67 & n. 146; Frantz,
supra note 111, at 1425, 1431; White, supra note 11, at 333;
Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing,
78 Colum. L. Rev. 1022, 1045, n. 120 (1978).
300

McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 197 (1864) (Harlan,
J., concurring) (Schneider is earliest cite given for narrow
tailoring principle in First Amendment); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (same); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
492-94 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (same); Wormuth and Mirkin,
supra note 45, at 272.
301

Because Schneider is commonly regarded as a Jehovah’s
Witness case, e.g., Patrick Flynn, “Writing Their Faith into the
Laws of the Land”, 10 Tex. J. Civ. Lib. & Civ Rts. 1, 10, 13
(2004); White, supra note 11, at 333, there may appear the
possibility of asserting, regardless of the Court’s express
analysis, that the case involved a concern for smoking out
illicit motive regarding that unpopular religion. Schneider,
however, was a consolidated case involving different handbill
ordinances from four disparate municipalities. Of the four
defendants, only Clara Schneider was a Witness. The other cases
involved the “Friends of the Lincoln Bridgade,” a “labor
picket,” and someone protesting “the administration of State
unemployment insurance.” Schneider, 308 U.S. at 154-57. Only by
66

Court specifically accepted the municipality’s claim that it was
banning handbilling as a means to prevent littering, but said
that purpose was “insufficient to justify” banning a traditional
means of communication given the existence of other means to
solve the littering problem.302 Similarly, Talley v.
California,303 which is among the cases that revived First
Amendment narrow tailoring in the 1960s, was also a balancing,
not a motive discovery, case.304
The same is true of the compelling state interest standard:
It was introduced for cost-benefit justification, not motive
the happenstance of case naming is that adjudication thought of
as a Witness case.
Moreover, the cases being discussed in the pages where
narrow tailoring was introduced and applied are the three cases
that did not involve Clara Schneider. Id. at 162. Thus, it
seems fair to accept the Court’s express pronouncement that the
“motive of the legislation under attack” in those three cases
was the legitimate motive of “the prevention of littering of the
streets.” Id.
302

Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162.

303

362 U.S. 60 (1960).

304

See Talley, 362 U.S. at 63-64 (mentioning various
factors that affect the outcome); id. at 65 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (saying “I do not believe that we can escape, as Mr.
Justice Roberts said in Schneider ... 'the delicate and
difficult task' of weighing 'the circumstances' and appraising
'the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the
regulation of the free enjoyment of' speech”); id. at 69 (Clark,
J., dissenting) (speaking of “weigh[ing] the interests of the
public ... against the claimed right of Talley”).
I do not rely on Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960),
which is conventionally cited as the seminal modern narrow
tailoring case. Shelton, like Talley, speaks entirely in terms
of costs and benefits. Shelton, supra, at 489-90.
Nevertheless, Shelton’s underlying facts involve a southern
legislature attempting to expose NAACP membership among public
school teachers. See L. Powe, supra note 49, at 168-69
(discussing Shelton). Because of the underlying facts, there is
at least a possibility that the Court, without mentioning it,
was influenced by a doubt about the legislature’s motive.
67

discovery purposes. Justice Frankfurter, who introduced the
concept to constitutional law,305 was not prone to concern
himself with legislative motive.306 Moreover, in Sweezy,
Frankfurter’s determination that the importance of academic
freedom left it uniquely beyond the reach of legislative
questioning, “except for reasons that are exigent and obviously
compelling,”307 was predicated entirely on a balancing
analysis.308 Similarly, Sherbert v. Verner,309 the case that
completed the process of introducing the compelling state
interest standard into First Amendment law,310 was a case in
which there was no intimation that state officials had a hidden
illicit motive.311
305

See supra text accompanying notes 69, 85-87 (discussing
Sweezy v. New Hampshire).
306

See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 468-69
(1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (saying legislative motive
“not open to judicial probing”); Communist Party v. SACB, 367
U.S. 1, 86 (1961) (“So long as Congress acts in pursuance of its
constitutional power, the Judiciary lacks authority to intervene
on the basis of the motives which spurred the exercise of that
power”) (quotation marks removed); Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
376, 377 (1951) (saying it is “not consonant with our scheme of
government for a court to inquire into the motives of
legislators”); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466-67 (1948)
(“We cannot cross-examine either actually or argumentatively the
mind of Michigan legislators nor question their motives”).
307

Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
308

Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 261, 266 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (speaking of “weigh[ing]” the government’s
justification against the harm resulting from its “intrusion
into the intellectual life a university” and of “balancing two
contending principles”).
309

374 U.S. 398 (1963).

310

See supra text accompanying notes 182-89 (discussing
Sherbert).
311

See Rubenfeld, supra note 288, at 443 n. 62 criticizing
the Free Exercise principle Sherbert introduced on just this
ground.
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Moreover, that strict scrutiny was formulated for costjustification and not for motive discovery purposes is suggested
by another facet of constitutional jurisprudence in the 1950s
and early 1960s. Throughout the years that strict scrutiny was
gestating in First Amendment litigation, the Court’s general
rule was that governmental motive was “irrelevant” to questions
of governmental power.312 That rule did not begin to change
until the early 1960s, when the Court “adjust[ed] constitutional
... doctrine[] in response” to the South’s “intransigence ...
disingenuousness .... endless evasion and bad faith” in
desegregation and racial classification cases.313 Gomillion v.
Lightfoot314 and Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward
County315 were the breakthrough cases in which the Court began to
take legislative motivation into account.316
The view that smoking out illicit motive was the original
purpose of strict scrutiny arose for two reasons. First there
was a politico-jurisprudential imperative. If strict scrutiny
is a cost-justification device, the Justices who employ it are
not acting as neutral observers merely seeking to determine if
the legislature had a purpose that everyone would regard as
Brennan did point out that the state unemployment
compensation scheme contained a discrimination in favor of
Sunday worship “in times of ‘national emergency’”. Sherbert,
374 U.S. at 406. But that part of the law had no application to
Sherbert’s claim.
312

John Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1205, 1208 (1970); See also M.
Klarman, supra note 98, at 340 (“in 1960, the weight of
authority still rejected judicial inquiries into legislative
motive”).
313

M. Klarman, supra note 98, at 342. See also Ely,
Legislative, supra note 312, at 1209 (saying it was “no great
surprise” that the Court “turned to the analysis of motivation”
in the desegregation struggle).
314

364 U.S. 339 (1960).

315

377 U.S. 218 (1964).

316

M. Klarman, supra note 98, at 340, 342; Ely,
Legislative, supra note 312, at 1209 (discussing Establishment
Clause precedent also).
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improper. They are overruling the legislative determination
that the benefit to society brought about by burdening a
protected right is worth it in the particular instance.
Although many contemporary Justices foreswear second-guessing
legislatures, the high-protectionist Justices who developed our
current generous protections for First Amendment values, and
invented strict scrutiny, were comfortable with that activity.
They thought it the essence of their role.317
It is no accident that John Ely was the first
constitutional theorist to rest strict scrutiny on ferreting out
illicit motive.318 Cost-benefit analysis, which inevitably
involves judicial second-guessing of a legislature’s or
executive branches’s balance among competing policy interests,
was anathema to Ely’s political process approach to
constitutional law.319 In other words, a large part of the
appeal of strict scrutiny’s “smoking out” rationale has been its
ability to allow the Court to appear value-free. According to
317

M. Shapiro, supra note 49, at 77; Kenneth Karst, The
First Amendment and Harry Kalven: An Appreciative Comment on the
Advantages of Thinking Small, 13 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 10 (1965).
318

J. Ely, Democracy, supra note 10, at 145-48. Ely’s
grounding of strict scrutiny in discovering illicit motive,
rather than cost-benefit analysis, traces at least to 1971. See
John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Discrimination,
41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 727 n. 26 (1974) (citing John Ely,
Judicial Review of Suspicious Classifications (Spring, 1971)
(unpublished manuscript). Many contemporary discussions trace
back to Ely. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 288, at 1945 n. 28;
Rubenfeld, supra note 288, at 436 n. 48.
319

J. Ely, Democracy, supra note 10, at 44-48, 165-66;
Michael Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process
Theory, 77 Va. L. Rev. 747, 772 (1991) (saying political process
theory’s “basic notion is that the political process is subject
to certain systemic flaws, and that judicial review should be
directed at remedying those situations rather than
superintending the outcomes of a properly functioning democratic
system”). For this reason, Ely opposed the fundamental interest
branch of strict scrutiny, except for voting rights. J. Ely,
Democracy, supra note 10, at 1-72, 116-25, 247-49 n. 52. Ely
favored active judicial protection of free speech, but he did
not discuss that protection in terms of strict scrutiny. Id. at
105-16.
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the “smoking out” rationale, all the Court is doing when it
applies strict scrutiny is the politically neutral task of
determining that no illicit purpose motivated the government
action at bar.
The second reason for the view that smoking out illicit
motive is strict scrutiny’s original rationale is the belief
that strict scrutiny originated in the Warren Court’s racial
discrimination cases.320 Although strict scrutiny can be, and
has been, used as a cost-benefit justification device, the
Warren Court did not use it that way in its racial
discrimination cases. After the Warren Court’s highprotectionist majority employed strict scrutiny in a number a
First Amendment cases in 1963, its heightened scrutiny of racial
discrimination cases involved the slow, piecemeal migration of
strict scrutiny into the Equal Protection Clause. Beginning in
1964, the Warren Court integrated narrow tailoring into the
equal protection clause, but not the compelling state interest
standard.321
In those cases, narrow tailoring
demonstrate that the laws at bar were
White Supremacy, an illicit motive if
one.322 Cost-benefit analysis was not

was employed to
part of the system of
ever the Warren Court saw
necessary to decide those

320

J. Ely, Democracy, supra note 10, at 145-48; Rubenfeld,
supra note 288, at 453-59; Simon, supra note 4, at 1067-71;
Note, Mental, supra note 247, at 1245-52.
321

See supra text accompanying notes 237-64.

322

Given the Court’s newly adopted view that racial
segregation was no longer a reasonable exercise of the police
power, Klarman, Interpretive, supra note 10, at 229-30, 254-55,
illicit motive analysis in these cases provided the most
generally acceptable grounds for the decision. During this
time, the Court upheld lower court decisions permitting racial
segregation in municipal holding cells where drunks were placed
until they sobered up, Lee, supra, and allowing states to
require divorce decrees to state the race of the parties, Tancil
v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964). As these were Per Curiam
decisions, whether the results were based on a motive or
balancing analysis is impossible to say.
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cases.323 Uncovering illicit motive provided the Warren Court
with an easy and sufficient ratio decidendi.324
The Warren Court’s focus, in such racial discrimination
cases as McLaughlin v. Florida325 and Loving v. Virginia,326 on
demonstrating illicit motive rather than the absence of costjustification, helps account for that Court’s failure to import
the compelling state interest standard into its racial
discrimination cases. A “compelling” state interest standard is
too demanding to function simply as a means to ferret out covert
illicit motive. As John Ely, who first explained the connection
between smoking out and equal protection’s increased demand for
the strength of the state’s justification, said:
[E]ven a perfect fit between the classification in issue
and the goal the state is arguing shouldn’t be enough to
allay your initial suspicion if that goal is so unimportant
that you have to suspect it’s a pretext that didn’t
actually generate the choice. ... There may be nothing
323

Cost-benefit analysis was not entirely absent. See
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (explaining why he agreed with the Court’s use of
the narrow tailoring principle, which “arose under the
principles of the First Amendment,” to decide an equal
protection case, and citing cases which illustrate the costbenefit rationale for narrow tailoring). See also Klarman,
Interpretive, supra note 10, at 256-57, 296 (saying the Warren
Court had no need, and did not, choose between the smoking out
and cost-benefit rationales of heightened scrutiny in its racial
classification cases).
324

See Karlan, supra note 288, at 1569, 1571 n. 13 (saying
that for the Warren Court “rational basis review” had been
sufficient to “eradicat[e] explicit racial classifications”).
Had the Court suggested reliance on the cost-benefit
understanding of heightened scrutiny its unanimity may have
fractured. At this time, there were three to four Justices who
opposed any suggestion that the racial classifications could be
justified by a balancing analysis, at least when criminal
sanctions were involved. See supra note 322 (discussing Lee,
McLaughlin, and Tancil).
325

379 U.S. 184 (1964).

326

388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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wrong with the fit, but the goal is so trivial in context
that you have to believe that it’s a rationalization for a
racially motivated choice.327
And after giving the example of temporarily separating the races
during a prison race riot, he went on to “functionally” define
the “compelling” standard “in terms of whether the claim that it
was the actual motivation is credible.”328
Ely’s point, therefore, may be satisfied by state interests
that, while more than trivial, are less than compelling.329 To
327

J. Ely, Democracy, supra note 10, at 147-48. See also,
Note, Mental, supra note 247, at 1251 (drawing from Ely’s
unpublished manuscript on suspect classifications, see supra
note 318, to say that the compelling interest standard is
inappropriate in suspect classification cases where the Court is
concerned with “purity of process” rather than substance; for
this reason, the compelling standard is appropriate for
fundamental rights cases).
328

Id. At 148. See also, 148 n. 46 (citing other scholars
and discussing other examples). But see Paul Brest, Forward: In
Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
15 n. 65 (1976) (defending the stringent standard on prophylaxis
grounds). Prophylaxis as a justification for the compelling
interest standard puts the error cost of not spotting a
government decision based on illicit motive on the state rather
than the individual. This justification understands the
compelling standard as a cost-benefit supplement to the smoking
out ability of a demand for a credible justification.
329

In other words, what has come to be called intermediate
scrutiny functions fairly well as a test to smoke out illicit
government motive. This is what the Court has done with
intermediate scrutiny in the gender classification cases, the
best account of which reflects a search for whether the
government’s action reflects real differences between men and
women or traditional sex roles and gender stereotypes. See,
e.g., Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 533 U.S.
53, 62-67 (2001); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266 n. 24
(1983); Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
724-25, 729 (1982); id. at 736, 740-41, 743 (Powell, J.,
dissenting; E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 737-38.
The success of intermediate scrutiny suggests that strict
scrutiny, with its compelling interest requirement, may well be
73

satisfy the smoking out rationale, what we need is a state
interest that is sufficiently important to “allay[]” the
“suspicion of racially prejudiced behavior.”330 That, of course,
tracks what the Warren Court was doing in the mid- to late1960s,331 as it, for example, struck down racial designations of
candidates on election ballots,332 but not racial designations on
vital records.333 In its race discrimination cases, the Warren
reserved for situations where the court is concerned not only
with the government’s motive, but also with second-guessing the
social costs and benefits of what the government has done
regardless of motive.
This analysis tracks historical development. As this
Article shows, the Court imported the compelling state interest
standard into racial discrimination cases when it turned to
affirmative action cases. See supra text accompanying notes
285-88. It was at that point that the Court began to review the
legislation not only for motivation, but for its cost-benefit
justification. See supra text accompanying note 293.
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J. Ely, Democracy, supra note 10, at 247 n. 46.
continued,

As Ely

Yes, it will inevitably involve balancing, but balancing
with a standard, whether what the state is now arguing
really could have been the motivation.
Id. See also, Simon, supra note 4, at 1071 (saying the state’s
interest must be “so important that we can with some confidence
draw the inference that reasonable decisionmakers would have
taken the challenged action whether they were affected by racial
prejudice”).
331

Ely was writing to justify the ways of the Warren Court
to the legal academy. Ely dedicated his book: “For Earl
Warren. You don’t need many heroes if you choose carefully.”
J. Ely, Democracy, supra note 10, at v.
332
333

Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964).

Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964), aff’g Hamm v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D.Va.
1964). See also Siegel, Equality, supra note 23, at 1515 n. 158
and accompanying text (discussing Martin and Tancil); Simon,
supra note 4, at 1075 (same). See also Greenawalt, supra note
295, at 565 n. 41 (saying “in some suspect classification cases
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Court was looking for acceptable state goals, goals of
sufficient weight to allay the suspicion of racial prejudice.334
The belief that modern strict scrutiny originated in the
Warren Court’s racial discrimination cases leads to the
misconception that strict scrutiny originated as a means to
ferret out illicit motive.335 But if strict scrutiny is a
doctrine that requires both narrow tailoring and a compelling
state interest, it not only did not begin in the Warren Court’s
racial discrimination cases, it was never used in them.336
Modern strict scrutiny began in First Amendment cases337 and

the [Warren] Court has weighed ends, even though it has not been
explicit about what it is doing”).
334

In other words, in its racial discrimination cases, the
Warren Court was not looking for compelling state interests and
never said it was. See Note, Mental, supra note 247, at 1245-52
(explaining suspect classification review as a search for narrow
tailoring and a permissible purpose).
335

See, e.g., J. Ely, Democracy, supra note 10, at 145-48
(discussing strict scrutiny’s rationale but only discussing
racial discrimination cases). Ely’s more extended discussion of
strict scrutiny embraced only suspect classifications, id. at
148-72.
336

The Warren Court certainly employed heightened
scrutiny, as I have defined it, see supra text accompanying note
24, in that the Court subjected racial classifications to close
analysis, sometimes by requiring narrow tailoring, McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), and sometimes by carefully parsing
the facts, Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 536-38 (1963). See
also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341-42 (1960) (racial
motive may be shown by the effect of a legislatively imposed
change in municipal boundaries). See also Klarman,
Interpretive, supra note 10, at 254-56 (saying the Warren Court
did not adopt a “presumptive rule against racial
classifications” until McLaughlin); Note, Mental, supra note
247, at 1251-52 (observing that in racial classification cases,
the Court required narrow tailoring and permissible, not
compelling state interest).
337

See supra text accompanying notes 49-189.
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migrated to the fundamental rights branch of equal protection at
the very end of the Warren Court.338
Tracing strict scrutiny’s roots back to First Amendment
narrow tailoring cases in the 1940s339 and compelling interest
cases in the 1950s and early 1960s,340 establishes strict
scrutiny as part of a constitutional paradigm in which, even for
high-protectionist Justices, no constitutional right was “beyond
limitation,”341 and none could prevail over an appropriate
subordinating governmental interest.342 As Justice Rutledge
wrote in Thomas v. Collins,343 in 1945, it was a paradigm in
which for a few preferred rights “[o]nly the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible
limitation.”344 That was a formula for cost-benefit
338

See supra text accompanying notes 265-84.

339

See supra text accompanying notes 47-48, 298-300
(discussing narrow tailoring).
340

See supra text accompanying notes 49-189 (discussing
the compelling standard).
341

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)
(speaking of rights of religion and parenthood). Justice
Rutledge, who wrote the opinion in Prince, was one of the 1940s
most civil libertarian Justices. See Mendelson, Clear, supra
note 52, at 320 (associating an “era par excellence of civil
liberties” with Rutledge’s tenure on the bench). See also
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 603 (Stone,
C.J., dissenting) (“In ... cases ... where there are competing
demands of the interests of government and of liberty under the
Constitution, and where the performance of governmental
functions is brought into conflict with specific constitutional
restrictions, there must, when that is possible, be reasonable
accommodation between them so as to preserve the essentials of
both and that it is the function of courts to determine whether
such accommodation is reasonably possible”).
342

See, e.g., Price, 321 U.S. at 166; Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 215 (1944).
343
344

323 U.S. 516 (1945).

Thomas, 323 US at 530. See also Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 215 (1944)(saying “[p]ressing public
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of [race-based]
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justification. And when Justice Brennan quoted Rutledge’s
remark in Sherbert v. Verner,345 he announced the birth of modern
strict scrutiny.
V.

Conclusion: The Origin of The Compelling State Interest
Test and the “Core Value” of the Equal Protection
Clause

Strict scrutiny, defined by the dual requirements of narrow
tailoring and the compelling state interest test, originated in
the First Amendment. Beginning in 1963, and for the remainder
of the Warren Court’s tenure, strict scrutiny was among the many
doctrines by which the Warren Court gave the freedoms of speech,
press, and religion substantial protection from government
interference. At that time, strict scrutiny did not play as
prominent a part in First Amendment jurisprudence as it would in
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, but it certainly was among
the Warren Court’s doctrinal resources.
The “compelling interest” branch of strict scrutiny can be
traced in First Amendment litigation back to 1957. It first
appeared in Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire,346 and was employed in six opinions for the Court
before 1963.347 In those cases, however, the “compelling
restrictions ; id. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting)(saying “[t]he
judicial test of whether the Government, on a plea of military
necessity, can validly deprive an individual of any of his
constitutional rights is whether the deprivation is reasonably
related to a public danger that is so immediate, imminent, and
impending as not to admit of delay”) (internal quotation marks
removed).
345

530).
346
347

374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (quoting Thomas, 323 U.S. at
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).

Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960);
Scull v. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. Commitee on Law Reform
and Racial Activities, 359 U.S. 344, 352 (1959); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 127 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360
U.S. 72, 79-81 (1959); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529
(1958); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463
(1958). It was also used in another concurrence, Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960) (Harlan, J., concurring), and
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interest” test was not part of a true strict scrutiny standard.
But if this latter claim is wrong, it only means that the
compelling state interest test and strict scrutiny originated in
First Amendment litigation even earlier than 1963.
In other words, if strict scrutiny in First Amendment
litigation dates back to 1957, it only amplifies this Article’s
most important finding: that the compelling state interest
standard and strict scrutiny was an established aspect of First
Amendment jurisprudence before their appearance in the Equal
Protection Clause in 1969.348
When strict scrutiny did appear in Equal Protection Clause
litigation, it was confined to cases which involved legislation
that burdened fundamental interests. Strict scrutiny did not
appear in equal protection racial discrimination cases until
1978. In that year, Justice Powell, who was not speaking for
the Court, employed strict scrutiny in casting the deciding vote
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.349 It was
not until 1984 that an opinion for the Court employed strict
scrutiny in a racial discrimination case.350
It is true that the Court first employed “narrow
tailoring,” which is part of the doctrine of strict scrutiny, in
deciding the landmark racial discrimination cases, McLaughlin v.
Florida351 and Loving v. Virginia,352 in 1964 and 1967
respectively. Due to the Court’s use of narrow tailoring, in
McLaughlin and Loving, as well as its announcement that

a dissent Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 610 (1961) (Brennan,
J., concurring and dissenting).
348

See supra text accompanying notes 265-77 (discussing
Cipriano v. City of Houma,395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); and Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969)).
349

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke v. 438
U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (per Powell, J).
350

Supra text accompanying note 283-84 (discussing Palmore
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)).
351

379 U.S. 184 (1964).

352

388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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legislatures need “some overriding statutory purpose”353 in order
to enact legislation with facial racial classifications,
scholars have described those cases as seminal instances of
strict scrutiny.354 But even if strict scrutiny in Equal
Protection Clause litigation dates to McLaughlin in 1964, it
still post-dates strict scrutiny’s gestation and appearance in
First Amendment controversies between 1957 and 1963.
Nonetheless, it is important to insist that McLaughlin and
Loving are instances of heightened, but not strict, scrutiny.
Acknowledging that McLaughlin and Loving employed only part of
modern strict scrutiny is essential for understanding the drawn
out and piecemeal migration of the branches of strict scrutiny
into the Equal Protection Clause. It helps explain why
commentators have mistakenly believed that smoking out illicit
motive was the original purpose of strict scrutiny.355 It also
highlights an important aspect of Supreme Court jurisprudence:
that the Court, in creating doctrine to guide decisionmaking by

353

McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192.
11 (same).

See also Loving, 388 U.S.

354

Klarman, Interpretive, supra note 10, at 296; Siegel,
Equality, supra note 23, at 1502-03.
355

See supra text accompanying notes 237-64 (discussing
the absence of of the compelling interest requirement in the
Warren Court’s race discrimination decisions); J. Ely,
Democracy, supra note 10, at 147-48 (describing the increased
burden of justification on the state as requiring narrow
tailoring and a “credible” state interest).
Perhaps, in light of the comments in the remainder of this
paragraph I should not say in this article that costjustification was the original purpose of strict scrutiny, but
only that it was the original purpose of strict scrutiny for
fundamental interests. In suspect classification cases,
heightened scrutiny’s original purpose was illicit motive
discovery. In other words, the two main branches of strict
scrutiny, fundamental interests and suspect classifications,
were fashioned to serve different goals. See Note, Mental,
supra note 247, at 1251 (explaining the compelling interest
test’s absence from suspect classification cases on ground that
in suspect classification cases the Court is interested in
motive not substance).
79

the lower courts, is often more particularistic than
commentators recognize.356
Although commentators write of a doctrine of strict
scrutiny that applies to suspect classifications and fundamental
interests,357 the Supreme Court seems to have created a variety
of heightened scrutinies, one for fundamental interests and
another for suspect classifications. Until the Burger and
Rehnquist Court’s affirmative action decisions, heightened
scrutiny of suspect classifications358 was used to ferret out
illicit motive while strict scrutiny of fundamental interests
focused on cost-justification.359
Even the categories “suspect classifications” and
“fundamental interests” may be too broad. Although alienage is
regarded, along with race, as a suspect classification,360 the
burden of justification in alienage cases, as settled in the
1970s, requires narrow tailoring and a “substantial” state
interest.361 That standard is a mixture of elements of strict
and intermediate scrutiny.362
356

But see, e.g, Geoffrey Stone, Content-Neutral
Restrictions, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 46, 48-54 (1987) (within the
First Amendment’s content-based / content-neutral framework
spotting seven different formulations for content neutral review
which belies the commentators’ two-tiered approach). See also
Frederick Schauer, Comment: Principles, Institutions, and the
First Amendment, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 85-86, 108-113 (1998)
(discussing the tension between the desire to adjudicate cases
by applying abstract categories or individuated considerations).
357

See, e.g., E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 646, 64849, 668, 739-42, 762-63, 767.
358

I say heightened scrutiny because this Article reserves
the term “strict scrutiny” for the doctrine that has both the
narrow tailoring and compelling interest requirements. See
supra text accompanying notes 24, 37.
359

See Note, Mental, supra note 247, at 1251 (spotting the
differential treatment of the two branches of strict scrutiny
and saying they serve different purposes).
360

See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376
(1971); E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 739-43.
361

See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 (1977)
(narrow tailoring and “substantial” government interest);
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As for fundamental interests, a recent article by Adam
Winkler shows that governmental action survives strict scrutiny
far more than is realized and that the survival rates differ
among subject areas.363 Averaging 30%, between 1990 and 2003 the
survival rate for legislation burdening the free exercise of
religion is 59%, while free speech restrictions prevail 22% of
the time.364 This suggests that the stringency of strict
scrutiny, and therefore the doctrine itself, varies from area to
area.
Finally, acknowledging the delayed migration of the
compelling interest standard into the Equal Protection Clause
sheds light on a significant aspect of Fourteenth Amendment
history. As Reva Siegel has demonstrated, the Warren Court
conceived the constitutional violation redressed in Brown v.
Board of Education as a racial classification that harmed a
Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 602 (narrow
tailoring and “substantial” interest); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
717, 722 (1973) (narrow tailoring and “substantial” interest,
but saying that interest has been described in various ways,
such as “compelling,” “important,” and “overriding”).
362

See E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 645 (discussing
strict and intermediate scrutiny). Recognizing that a variety
of approaches have traditionally fit under the strict scrutiny
umbrella may enhance our understanding of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) which
applies strict scrutiny to racial classifications in the context
of University admissions with unusual deference to the views of
governmental decisionmakers. Id. at 328. See also Johnson v.
California, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 1157 (2005) (Thomas, J., joined by
Scalia, J., dissenting) (saying they would accord prison
officials such deference that strict scrutiny should not apply
to racial classifications in prison).
363

Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An
Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, ___
Vand. L. Rev. ___ (2006) (forthcoming) (SSRN file name:
SSRN_ID897360_code109222.pdf)
364

Winkler, supra note 363, at 15, 17. The survival rate
of freedom of association restrictions is 33%, while fundamental
rights restrictions survive 24% of the time. Id. at 17.
Winkler also found that suspect classification discrimination is
upheld in 27% of the cases. Id.
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traditionally subordinated minority.365 According to Professor
Siegel, it was the politics of defending Brown against massive
Southern resistance and critical scholarly commentary that drove
the Court, in the early 1960s, to begin pursuing its struggle
against the historic subordination of African-Americans through
less politically controversial rhetoric.366 That new rhetoric
spoke of the presumptive unconstitutionality of racial
classifications per se, not of the evil of racial subordination;
it was a rhetoric of individual rights, not group rights.367
To be sure, it was not until the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts’ attack on affirmative action, in the late 1970s, 1980s,
and 1990s, that the Court found in the Equal Protection Clause a
firm principle – the “colorblind Constitution”368 – that
proscribed racial classifications even when their purpose and
effect was to benefit historically oppressed minorities.
Although it was the Burger and Rehnquist Court that turned the
Equal Protection Clause from an anti-racial-subordination into
an anti-racial-classification provision, it was the Warren
Court’s politically “cautious”369 rhetoric in McLaughlin and
Loving that laid the groundwork.
In Reva Siegel’s view, McLaughlin and Loving are important
transitional cases that initiated the shift in the Court’s
vision of the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause from the
norm of antisubordination to the norm of anticlassification.370
According to Professor Siegel, the Court that decided Brown
conceived the constitutional problem of Jim Crow as a system of
365

Siegel, Equality, supra note 23, at 1480-89.

366

Id. at 1500-05.

367

Id. at 1472-76.

368

See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
("Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens." (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J. dissenting)));
369

Siegel, Equality, supra note 23, at 1502.

370

For the comments in this paragraph, see Siegel,
Equality, supra note 23, at 1500-05 (discussing McLaughlin and
Loving).
82

laws that demeaned and subordinated minorities. It was not
until McLaughlin and Loving that the Court began treating racial
classification simpliciter as the gist of the constitutional
wrong. In McLaughlin, the Court for the first time treated
racial classification as “presumptively unconstitutional.”371 In
Loving, the Court voided an anti-miscegenation law both because
it “enforced a system of racial hierarchy”372 and because it
violated the Constitution’s newly announced presumptive bar to
racial classifications. Together, McLaughlin and Loving show
the Court “revising its doctrinal framework” to be more
politically cautious, while not entirely “abandon[ing] the
concern with status harm that animated Brown.”373 Responding to
political resistance, the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence
was in transition. In McLaughlin and Loving, the Court’s
anticlassification talk was still being driven by
antisubordination theory. It was not until the Burger and
Rehnquist courts that colorblindness, rather than preventing
harm to racial minorities, became the Fourteenth Amendment’s
core value.
Professor Siegel’s nuanced analysis correlates with this
Article’s observation that in McLaughlin and Loving the Court
imported narrow tailoring but not the compelling interest
standard into the Equal Protection Clause’s analysis of racial
discrimination cases. When the Warren Court imported narrow
tailoring into the Equal Protection Clause in McLaughlin and
Loving, it did so as a means to ferret out laws enacted with the
illicit motive of subordinating minorities.374 Because the
Warren Court did not have the goal of second-guessing the
legislative judgment on whether laws that benefited racial
minorities were cost-justified, it did not import the
“compelling interest” requirement into its racial classification
cases.375 The compelling interest standard increases the
371

Siegel, Equality, supra note 23, at 1501.

372

Siegel, Equality, supra note 23, at 1504.

373

Siegel, Equality, supra note 23, at 1504.

374

See supra text accompanying notes 320-24 (discussing
the Warren Court’s racial discrimination cases between 1964 and
1969).
375

Support for this observation may be found in John Ely’s
explication of strict scrutiny in racial classification cases.
Ely wrote during the transitional era when the Court had
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importance of the state’s goal so much more than is necessary to
police the state’s motive that it must be understood as a tool
of cost-benefit analysis.376
At least, that is how the Court has used it. The
compelling interest requirement in First Amendment litigation,
and in the fundamental rights branch of equal protection has
been used as a cost-justification metric.377 It was when the
Burger and Rehnquist courts imported the compelling state
interest standard into the Equal Protection Clause that the
Court finally ruled that all racial classifications caused
dignitary harms that were proscribed by the Equal Protection
Clause.378 When the Burger and Rehnquist courts did that, they
began employing strict scrutiny in racial classification cases
not as a means to “smoke out” illicit motive, but as a means to
declare that, on balance, the harm to whites was not worth the
benefit to historically subordinated groups.379 The Supreme
Court’s belated and controverted decision to impose the
compelling state interest standard on affirmative action laws
reflects its decision to shift the premises of the Equal
imported narrow tailoring, but not the compelling interest
requirement, into racial classification cases. Ely, therefore,
understood the purpose of strict scrutiny in racial
classification cases as ensuring that the state had a proper
motive. Accordingly, he thought the state needed to show only
that the law’s purpose was not so trivial that its assertion
indicated a ruse. See supra text accompanying notes 327-30
(discussing Ely). Concomitantly, he was one of the first
prominent scholars to write in support of the constitutionality
of affirmative action. See John Ely, The Constitutionality of
Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 727, 741
(1974). Ely understood the Equal Protection Clause as
effectuating an anti-racial-subordination, not an anti-racialclassification, policy.
376

See supra text accompanying notes 327-30 (discussing
Ely’s analysis of strict scrutiny).
377

See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 182-88, 265-74
(discussing Sherbert v. Verner and Shapiro v. Thompson).
378

City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).

379

See supra text accompanying note 291 (quoting Adarand
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995)).
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Protection Clause from antisubordination to anticlassification
theory.380
Thus, the piecemeal migration of the branches of strict
scrutiny into the Equal Protection Clause’s racial
discrimination cases evidences an important transition in
constitutional law. As Oliver Wendell Holmes once observed, for
good or for ill, “[t]he law is the witness and external deposit
of our moral life.”381

380

As Reva Siegel points out, the relaxed application of
strict scrutiny in Grutter reflects a Court that, without
emphasizing it, has trimmed its commitment to anticlassification
as the Equal Protection Clause’s core value. The outcome and
some of the analysis in Grutter reflect a concern for the
legislative betterment of subordinated minorities even if it
means upholding government action that classifies citizens
according to their race. Siegel, Equality, supra note 23, at
1538-43.
381

Oliver Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev.
457, 459 (1897), repr. 110 id. at 991, 992 (1997).
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